

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

TO

CONDUCT AN INQUIRY INTO THE MILITARY
SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND THE FACTS
SURROUNDING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL OF
THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR FROM HIS
ASSIGNMENTS IN THAT AREA

PART 1

MAY 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, AND 14, 1961

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and the Committee on Foreign Relations



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MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a. m. in the caucus room, Senate Office Building; Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Toby, Byrd, Johnson (Texas), Kefauver, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the staff of the Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kaliyarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations; C. C. O'Day, clerk; and Pat M. Holt, associate clerk.

(Subheadings within the text have been inserted by committee staff in order to make hearings more readable and easier to follow.)

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, today we are opening hearings on momentous questions. These questions affect not only the lives of every citizen, but they are vital to the security of our country and the maintenance of our institutions of free Government.

We shall attempt to obtain the facts which are necessary to permit the Congress to discharge its proper functions and make correct decisions on the problem of war and peace in the Far East and indeed throughout the world.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has consented to be the first witness at these hearings. I am sure it is unnecessary for me to attempt to recount in detail the deeds and services which have endeared General MacArthur to the American people.

On the permanent pages of our history are inscribed his achievements as one of the great captains of history through three armed conflicts; but he is not only a great military leader, his broad understanding and knowledge of the science of politics has enabled him to restore and stabilize a conquered country and to win for himself and for his country the respect and affection of a people who were once our bitterest enemies.

The general is here today to counsel with our committees and to help us in the fulfillment of our legislative responsibilities.

SPIRIT OF THE HEARINGS

In his address to the Congress on April 19 the general said:

I do not stand here as an advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected.

I wholeheartedly associate myself with that sentiment. I hope these hearings may be conducted from beginning to end in that spirit. If they are not conducted with the single purpose of serving the national interest in this hour of crisis, we will fail those who have given us their confidence and depend upon us for leadership and guidance.

The guiding light here today, and in the days to follow, must be the national interest, for the national interest transcends, in importance, the fortunes of any individual, or group of individuals.

If we are to exercise one of the highest legislative functions, we must see that the American people are brought the truth, and the whole truth, without the color of prejudice or partisanship, and with no thought as to personalities.

If we do less, we will thwart the proper working of the processes upon which the success of our form of government depends.

MILITARY SECURITY ASPECTS OF HEARINGS

General MacArthur, I am sure you are aware of the controversy as to whether or not these hearings should be in open, or executive session.

Those of us who have supported the executive sessions are anxious to see that the facts reach the American people as rapidly as they are developed.

We have, however, been apprehensive lest, in the heat of controversy, questions of some committee members, or an ungarded statement of some unskilled witness might endanger the lives of our fighting men, or endanger the national security.

Your vast experience makes you one of the best qualified men in this country, on the question of what might effect the safety of our soldiers, and the security of our Nation. It is my desire that the transcripts of these hearings should be full and complete, except for material which would be helpful to our enemies.

You can render a great service to the members of this committee, and to the American people, if you would indicate, as the hearings proceed, any material which, in your judgment, might have a damaging effect.

I do not like to be put in the position of constantly admonishing, some Senators might call it lecturing, Members of the Senate, on the importance of taking extreme care to maintain all reasonable security precautions.

I think we all know how difficult that problem is, and how skillful many outsiders, particularly gentlemen of the fourth estate, are in piecing together a series of separate and apparently unrelated comments that they get from different Members of Congress, into stories that could be very damaging.

Of course, as chairman of this committee, I feel a particular responsibility in respect to classified information.

I am perfectly willing to bear my full share of that responsibility; but I hope that all of the Members of the Senate will cooperate to the utmost in discharging their responsibility and obligation, which is equally mine.

Now, General MacArthur, I do not know whether or not you have a prepared statement. The Senators present would appreciate any remarks you may care to offer as a basis for opening these hearings.

Keep your seat, General, if you choose, if you find it more comfortable.

General MacArthur. Thank you. I associate myself—
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, are you going to swear the witness?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for reminding me of that.

General MacArthur, the committee took the extraordinary action, in view of the fact that we did not know what the scope of these hearings would be, and the large number of witnesses that might be brought in, of directing me as chairman to administer the oath to all of the witnesses who might appear.

The evidence which you are about to present the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations bearing upon the matters under inquiry shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

(General MacArthur and General Whitney nodded affirmatively.)
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. COURTNEY WHITNEY

General MacArthur. I would associate myself entirely, Senator, with your preliminary remarks. I have no prepared statement.

My comments were made fully when I was so signally honored by the Congress in inviting me to appear before them. I appear today not as a voluntary witness at all, but in response to the request of the committee, and I am entirely in the hands of the committee.

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTEGRATION OF ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. General, I shall ask a few questions, then, bearing upon particularly the matters within the purview of the Committee on Armed Services. This is the first opportunity that the committee has had to have with us a commanding officer from the field who has been in close day-to-day contact with operations in Korea.

You, of course, are aware of the long efforts that have been made in the Congress to coordinate the activities of the several branches of the fighting machine, and to weld them into an effective fighting machine.

I should like to ask you if, as a result of your experiences in Korea during this struggle, you feel that we have accomplished the complete integration as a fighting machine of the various services.

General MacArthur. I can only speak for what has occurred within what was my theater of responsibility, Senator. You would know more about the integration here or in continental America probably than I would, but in the Far East the integration of the three fighting services has been as complete as I could possibly imagine.

They have worked as a team. The responsiveness of each service to the desires and wishes of the other has been almost perfection. The integration there has been much more than the integration of the three services. It has been the integration of the forces of a number of nations, all of which had various components there. I would rate it as 100 percent, and the only reason I do not rate it higher is because I believe the mathematicians say 100 percent is all there is.

The CHAIRMAN. That includes the cooperation between the air in support of ground forces as well as all of the other phases of activity, tactical activity?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. What I am referring to is the coordination. I am not referring to the efficiencies; I am referring to basic amalgamation of the services and their efforts in support of each other.

QUALITY OF SOUTH KOREAN SOLDIERS

The CHAIRMAN. General, we have received conflicting reports as to the battle efficiency of the South Korean forces. Some of the fragmentary reports we have received and some of the reports we have received from those in the lower echelons has been that they are very fine soldiers, and others that have been there have spoken of them somewhat disparagingly. The committee would like to have your viewpoint on the South Korean soldiers.

General MACARTHUR. In courage and in determination, and in resolution, they are very fine troops. They lack the background of long tradition. They lack an officer corps, which takes years to build up. They lack in the efficacy of long periods of training. The lack in certain instances of matériel and other deficiencies is apparent. But within the physical limitations that exist, I regard them as very fine, indeed.

Their casualties, compared with the forces that were committed, reflect an indomitable spirit for victory. They are lightly armed and are at their best in what you might call the reconnaissance and exploitive features of campaigns.

They do not have the depth of matériel to resist, as well as some other of our forces there, the attack of well-equipped, experienced modern armies.

In certain of their efforts, such as the exploitive pursuits they are unequaled. They can go further on less than any troops I have ever commanded. As all troops have, they have many excellent points and they have some weak points.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to their—

General MACARTHUR. The difference in reporting is perfectly natural. You will find that that exists on all battlefields in all areas. The instances that fall under one man's observation may be good; another group may be bad. The sum total of the Korean, as I say, within his limitations, is high.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to their lack of matériel. We are supplying them. Is that because we do not have the supplies for them or because they are not capable of using larger quantities of matériel and equipment?

General MACARTHUR. The supplies that were available to me were not entirely adequate to arm them in the same ratio as our own troops.

In supplying heavy weapons, such as artillery, tanks, and things of that sort, it takes a high degree of training; it takes time. They have a great pool of manpower but it is untrained. To train it takes considerable time, and the supplies to equip them on the same basis as our troops have not been available.

INTEGRATION OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA

The CHAIRMAN. You referred, General, to what had been accomplished in handling troops of different nations, of various tongues. Do you think that the experience we have had there might stand us in good stead in the event of an all-out war where we would undertake to have armies that would be composed of soldiers from many nations? Has it been on a large enough scale to assist us and other members of the United Nations—have they transported enough troops there to where that experience would really be of any benefit to us in the case of an all-out war between communism and the free world?

General MACARTHUR. I would doubt it very much, Senator. The forces of all of the nations except the South Koreans and ours are token forces at best.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any difficulties encountered in integrating the efforts of those token forces?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have American officers who could speak Turkish, for example, to serve as liaison with the Turkish commanding officer?

General MACARTHUR. We managed to make ourselves reciprocally understood.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I asked the question—I have been concerned about our training of our commissioned personnel, particularly, in the different languages to enable us to have a coordinated force in the event, which God forbid is necessary, to assemble one to resist communism.

General MACARTHUR. I will say that the Turkish Brigade is one of the finest I have ever been associated with.

The CHAIRMAN. Elite troops, I suppose, and picked for that purpose, were they not, General?

General MACARTHUR. I could not tell you that, Senator.

CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR STRENGTH

The CHAIRMAN. What was the estimate of the Chinese air strength at the time you left the theater, the best estimate that our intelligence had been able to gather of the strength of air that was available by Chinese Communists or others?

We read from time to time where there are brushes between our jet planes and enemy planes of some character and description. Do you have any estimate you could give us as to the total strength of that Chinese Air Force?

General MACARTHUR. The estimates varied. They varied as low as 300 planes and as high as 800 planes. I saw one estimate that went up to above a thousand. The actual strength is conjectural.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they yet attacked our Ground Forces in Korea, the Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. Not in any serious way. There has been an occasional, sporadic strike of one or two planes, but nothing of any serious nature whatsoever?

The CHAIRMAN. Has that been bombing, strafing, or both?

General MACARTHUR. I could not tell you, Senator. The instances were of such minor importance that the details I would not attempt to recall.

SOVIET STRENGTH IN THE FAR EAST

The CHAIRMAN. I was impressed, General, in your tribute to the Japanese people in your address to the Congress. You stated about the hazard of removing all of the troops that we had, garrison troops, from Japan to the field in Korea. If Russia had seen fit to have moved at that time, I assume that they could have captured Japan, could they not?

General MACARTHUR. I would doubt it very seriously, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You would doubt it?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. I don't believe that Japan could have been taken except by an amphibious effort. And as long as we held control of the sea and of the air over that sea, I would doubt that the Soviet would have been able to overrun Japan in any coup de main.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is always difficult for us to have any real estimate of Russian strength in that area. Some sources contend that it is very substantial; they have great airborne armies that they can transport by air from place to place as well as considerable air strength. What did your intelligence reveal as to that?

General MACARTHUR. I will give you my own estimate, if you will permit me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. The Soviet in the Far East deploys possibly between [deleted].

[Deleted] of armed men in the various three services. He is dependent for their support almost entirely from European Russia.

This side of the Bicol region, there is no industrial set-up of major proportion, so that all of the munition equipment, all the strategic war weapons, all of the sustenance that goes in in such major quantity to support armed forces, must pass over that railway line which runs from European Russia across Siberia.

That line is strained to the very utmost now to maintain on a normal peace basis the forces which the Soviet maintains in Siberia.

I do not believe that it would be within the capacity of the Soviet to mass any great additional increment of force to launch any predatory attack from the Asiatic continent.

I believe that the dispositions of the Soviet forces are largely defensive. I believe that the Soviet has so often repeated the incorrect statement that we are planning to attack him, that he has finally begun to believe himself.

I believe that the weakness of Red China, a weakness which is very noticeable in the air and on the sea, is a corollary of the inability of the Soviet logistical system to send out those munitions to assist its ally.

I believe that the Soviet has the capacity to launch a punishing attack upon Japan, but I do not believe the Soviet has the capacity to overrun Japan until she gets command of the sea and of the air.

That she could get the command of the sea in the face of our magnificent Navy, I would be very doubtful of under any circumstances.

SOVIET AIR STRENGTH IN FAR EAST

Their air is not to be discounted. The estimates of the air strength in the Far East vary. I have seen it put as high as [out] planes, including the naval planes of their fifth and seventh fleets, which are out there.

My own belief is that they could initially launch, perhaps [deleted] planes.

Of those planes, the majority are fighters. Of those fighters, the majority are jets, and are excellent.

The Soviet probably suffers greatly from a lack of maintenance facilities, gasoline, petroleum supplies, and other things.

How long she would be able to maintain an air effort in an all-out war out there is, of course, speculative.

My own opinion is that it would not be too long. I believe that their efforts would deteriorate from the beginning of hostilities.

She has over there now in counted planes, of course [deleted], but they are scattered; their use, their logistical position, gives no indication of any immediate preparation for assault.

Now, when you speculate along that line you are truly speculating. This is the estimate that I had at the time I left.

The very fact that when I poured all our troops from Japan into Korea, and there was no slightest evidence on the part of the Soviet to take any advantage as far as Japan was concerned of that situation, would tend to bear out my estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the submarine strength of the Soviet in that area?

General MACARTHUR. The Soviet, the Russian over the centuries has never been able to develop a navy. It has been of course the political basis of Russian foreign policy to obtain a commercial naval force with a combat force to protect it.

RUSSIAN INTEREST IN ACCESS TO THE SEA AND SEAPOWER

The Russian has always believed that he could not take his rightful place in the international sphere of commerce and industry unless he shared the commerce of the seas. For centuries he has been seeking warm waters. For centuries the fundamental political policy of the British Empire, no matter what party grew up in place of the Prime Minister, has been to prevent that, and always they have been successful.

The objective of Russia for many decades was the Mediterranean. It not only would have given her warm water, given her a chance to develop her transportation, her water transportation facilities, but would have cut the lifeline of her great rival.

Whether you believe in the British or whether you do not, they were amazingly successful either on the field of battle in the utilization of the principle of the balance of power, or in combinations and leagues of various nations to prevent that tremendous expansion. Without that, Russia could not dominate and control the world.

Now recently the Russian has probably had a new vision opened. That vision is no longer confined to the warm water of the Mediterranean or Europe. It is the possibility of reaching the warm waters of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

If by any combination she could extend down to the Indian Ocean, she would not only outflank the Mediterranean, of course, but it would place her fair and flush upon the continent of Africa, which for the next hundred years, with its enormous industrial potential, is something that attracts all commerce and all industry, whatever its nationality might be.

It is a vision which perhaps transcends anything that the old Czarist regimes ever had.

Now as to the possibilities of what may accrue after you reach warm water, you have reached a different phase. As I said to start with, the Russian has never been a seagoing man. It has been his enormous weakness. His great strength has always been on the ground. It takes decades, some of us believe it takes centuries, to develop a merchant marine and combat vessels to protect them. The Russians have never shown that capacity in the slightest degree.

STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE FAR EAST

Over in the Far East their fleets, the Fifth and the Seventh Fleet, are light elements, cruiser, destroyer. They would not be a match either in quantity and certainly not in quality with our own forces.

Along the lines of submarines, the estimates vary. Probably the superior methods of gathering intelligence here in the Central Intelligence Agency gives a great deal more information than I could give you. I am very limited, and what I could gather was on my immediate front and under inhibitions that have probably never been equaled.

SOVIET SUBMARINES

My own belief is that she might have, in the neighborhood of Vladivostok, and in that area, probably [deleted] submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. Any snorkels, General?

General MACARTHUR. I should say that she would have, perhaps, [deleted] modern submarines—German.

Now, whether she has the German crews to man them, I do not know. If they have, they are first class. No better submarine service was ever developed than the German.

Now, the boats, themselves, are unquestionably German. Whether they are manned by efficient crews, I could not tell you. I would have doubts about it.

The majority of their submarines are of low radius, and are largely for defensive purposes. Their training is largely to prevent an amphibious thrust by us into their harbors.

Now, a submarine attack is a serious thing to any logistical line of supply overseas. The mere threat of it means that you cannot dispatch transports and supply ships without the enormous effort of conveying them.

So, the mere threat of submarining would have a very potential effect upon the operations in the Far East.

RUSSIA'S MESHING OF ACTION TO OURS

The CHAIRMAN. General, you stated, in your address to the Congress, that Russia would not necessarily mesh their actions to ours. Could that be construed as a statement of your belief that they would not mesh their actions with ours?

General MACARTHUR. Everything I say, Senator, of course, is on my own personal authority, and represents nothing but my own views. The CHAIRMAN. A great many people are interested in your views.

SOVIET CHOICES OF ACTION

General MACARTHUR. My own belief is that the Soviet has two great choices—this perhaps oversimplifies, but it will illustrate my thought.

Those two great choices are: First, whether he, at some time or other, is going to attack or not.

The second choice is the reverse of that: Whether he is not going to attack.

He knows, just as well as you and I know, that we are not going to attack him.

If he has determined that he is not going to attack, that he is doing well enough in the present atmosphere, that he is acquiring and expanding as rapidly as he can digest it; and that he is not going to attack, and that is his basic policy—I do not believe that anything that happens in Korea, or Asia, for that matter, would affect his basic decision.

If he has determined that he is going to use force, sooner or later, what occurs in Korea, or in Asia, might affect his timetable.

I believe that he will make his decisions on a higher basis than the incidents that are occurring in Asia at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have any opinion as to whether their strategy is to move in Asia, or Europe, first; or do you think that they have any hard and fast plans in either direction, but are awaiting events that might make one or the other area more propitious?

General MACARTHUR. I would say that it would be highly speculative to attempt to guess; that it would be quite ridiculous.

I believe that the Soviet high command, from the military standpoint, represents a high degree of efficiency. I do not believe that they would put themselves into any strait-jacket of inflexibility, any program of A, B, C, or June, July, or August, which would determine it.

I believe that, like all good commanders, they would be flexible enough to adjust their movements to the conditions that exist.

GROUND TROOPS NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH UN MISSION IN KOREA

The CHAIRMAN. General, did you ever submit any estimate as to the number of troops that would be necessary to accomplish the mission of the United Nations in Korea, under the conditions which attach themselves to the command in that area?

General MACARTHUR. I have constantly asked for more troops than I was able to obtain, Senator, from the beginning of hostilities.

The numbers that were available to me were limited, and I was informed to that effect; and, with what I had, I did the best I could.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be an estimate that you would not care to make, but do you have any estimate of the number of troops that it would take?

General MACARTHUR. You go into a field that cannot be answered categorically, in that way, Senator.

The number of troops that you speak of are the ground troops, I suppose?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, and their supporting elements.

General MACARTHUR. The supporting elements are acting in such a limited way that it is impossible, for me, at least, to make a categorical reply to your question.

The air and naval forces that were at my disposal out there were only operating at a fraction of their efficiency. They are in effect—by being confined to the narrow area of the battleground of Korea—they are in effect merely performing that function which would be regarded as tactical support of the infantry line.

The great strategic concept of stopping the supplies to troops, of preventing the build-up of troops to be thrown against them, to the disorganization of transportation lines—all of the uses which over the years and centuries the Navy and Air are supposed to do are not permitted over there.

If you would take off and permit them their full capacity, I do not believe it would take a very great additional component of ground troops to wind this thing up.

Now, actually if you do not permit the use of our forces in their normal capacity, you would not be able to supply enough ground troops in Korea to be able to safely clear North Korea.

You would go up to the Yalu and you would be in a position where the enemy could jump you immediately. I don't know how many troops it would take you to do that—ground troops—but they are quite beyond the capacity of this country to supply and maintain with our base 10,000 miles away—and do anything else.

RELATIONSHIP OF COMMANDER TO UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. General, will you clarify for the benefit of the committee your position as Commander in Chief of the United Nations there as well as of the United States forces? When you submitted your request for troops, did you submit it to the Government of the United States or did you submit it to the United Nations or both?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, my connection with the United Nations was largely nominal. There were provisions made that the entire control of my command and everything I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff and my channel of communication was defined as the Army Chief of Staff.

Even the reports which were normally made by me to the United Nations were subject to censorship by our State and Defense Departments. I had no direct connection with the United Nations whatsoever.

The controls over me were exactly the same as though the forces under me were all American. All of my communications were to the American high command here.

CENSORING OF REPORTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of your communications to the United Nations that went through that chain of command actually censored?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. The reports that I made, comments and suggestions—suggestions came back to me as to whether I would accept the changes. Many of those changes I accepted. There were at least in one case changes which I would not accept, changes which seemed to me to place a political slant upon a military officer's report, which were not warrantable.

In that it created a degree of discussion between the State and Defense Departments.

The Defense Department supported my point of view, and maintained that nothing should go in over my signature that I did not approve.

I might say that I would not have permitted anything to go in over my name that I did not approve.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that change to which you refer, General, that you refused to make on the request of the Defense Establishment? You said there were—

General MACARTHUR. I don't know whether the requests were from the State or the Defense Establishment.

The reports that I submitted were passed through both of them, but they made a number of changes in practically every report. I have not got the files here, and I couldn't tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. I, of course, realize the impossibility of remembering everything that was in them. You stated there were some of them that you agreed to, but there was one occasion that you did not agree to a change. I thought, perhaps, that would stand out in your mind as much as would some, if not argument, discussion, at least, on this subject.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I couldn't reconstitute this without going into the records. It is entirely available. All you have to do is call on the Department for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; but I have not had an opportunity to do so; I have had quite a few details to read all these records, and I, of course, knowing your memory, thought, perhaps, you would recall just what that incident was.

General MACARTHUR. The general gist of it was, as I said, that it seemed to introduce a political slant which the State Department believed would be advantageous in its handling of the various nations of the United Nations at Lake Success.

It did not agree with my own military concepts, and the reports I put in were intended to be entirely factual—the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, as far as I saw it.

Is there any objection to my smoking?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; it is perfectly agreeable. The members of the committee have been smoking, and we certainly would not extend to them any right that would not be extended to you, General.

TIME OF PROPOSAL TO BOMB MANCHURIA AND BLOCKADE CHINA

Prior to the time that the Chinese Communists intervened in the war, had any question arisen as to the blockade of China or of the bombing of bases in Manchuria in the event that they did intervene?

General MACARTHUR. I don't entirely recall, Senator, except the question of the "hot pursuit," I know that the Air wished from the very beginning to pursue an attacking enemy plane to the death, whether it was over the border line or not.

The directives forbade that. The question of the blockade of China, the Chinese coasts, as far as I can recall, when the war was confined to the North Koreans, hadn't agitated our headquarters anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the North Koreans did not have enough air to make that really a vital question; did it, pursuit?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not really become an issue until after the Chinese intervened.

General MACARTHUR. Correct; but the question was raised at the very beginning, whether we could pursue an attacking plane to a conclusion in the air fight.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall at what period during the operations that you first formally suggested to the Defense Establishment that you be permitted to carry on air operations over Manchuria or to blockade the China coast? I do not mean the exact date, General; I mean relative to events. Was it just after the Chinese intervened or about the time that you issued your statement that it was an entirely new war?

General MACARTHUR. It was after the Chinese intervened, and it was definitely established that they were making war on our forces in Korea.

There were various recommendations put in immediately thereafter—after it was determined that China was warring against us, Red China, I put in the application for the use of—that the wraps be taken off the forces in Formosa. There were other recommendations that went in at various times, but I would not—I could not at this stage—I will say that there were a number of visits by the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, at which those points were discussed in detail, and our position was set forth. However, the decisions were made in Washington, and were complied with completely and absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. So after the Chinese Communists came in and immediately after it was evident that they were in large numbers attacking your forces, you did recommend that the naval blockade be enforced and that what you have very graphically described as a sanctuary in Manchuria be subject to air attack, and that the Chinese Nationalist troops be employed?

General MACARTHUR. I very definitely recommended that the Chinese Nationalist troops be employed. Whether there was any definite written form in the other things, I do not recall.

In my discussions with General Collins I pointed out how extraordinarily necessary it was to lift those inhibitions.

FORM OF THE PROPOSALS

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not formally request that through channels, that those interdictions be removed?

General MACARTHUR. The requests were made of course to the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, in the references. You understand that from the beginning these inhibitions were listed, Senator, and

they were never lifted, and when General Collins came out there on these various things, I pointed out the grave effects of not lifting them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understood that. Of course that is the point; the very vital question about this whole tragic controversy is the employment of the Nationalist troops, the position of a naval blockade and the bombing of the bases and lines of supply and communications of the Communist Chinese.

Now every member of the committee wishes to develop just how the controversy arose, whether it was through a formal request or through discussion with General Collins and likewise as to your best estimate as to the time.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF (JCS) OF JANUARY 12, 1951

General MACARTHUR. The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and my own so far as I know were practically identical. On January 12 the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a study to the Secretary of Defense embodying these conditions:

That we were to continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

That we were to prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

Remove now the restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistical support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

Those views which were put in on January 12 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unquestionably the result largely of the conferences which we were going on constantly between my headquarters and Washington. I was in full agreement with them and am now.

As far as I know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have never changed those recommendations. If they have, I have never been informed of it.

I want to say that the relationships between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself have been admirable. All members are personal friends of mine. I hold them individually and collectively in the greatest esteem. If there has been any friction between us, I am not aware of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that message transmitted to you as the commander of those forces by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General MACARTHUR. I beg your pardon, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Was that message, that document from which you have just read, transmitted to you as part of your instructions?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. This was the recommendation, the study made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was submitted to the Secretary of Defense. A copy of it was furnished me.

NO ACTION ON RECOMMENDATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. But it was furnished to you as a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and you of course awaited a decision from that source before proceeding along—

General MACARTHUR. A decision putting this into effect never arrived.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any instructions it was not to be put into effect?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You of course being in Korea and Japan do not know, or do you know, what happened to those recommendations?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. They were submitted to you as a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs dependent upon the approval of the Secretary of Defense or the Commander in Chief, is that a fair statement?

General MACARTHUR. A copy was furnished me of this military study which the Joint Chiefs of Staff made to the Secretary. A copy was sent to me for my information only.

The CHAIRMAN. So if that was a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs, it encountered a veto somewhere along the line, either from the Secretary of Defense or the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States?

General MACARTHUR. I would assume so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Joint Chiefs ever advise you formally or informally as to what happened to their recommendations?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not discuss it with them on subsequent visits to your command?

General MACARTHUR. I discussed, every time any of them ever came out there, I discussed all these subjects.

The CHAIRMAN. And they did not tell you what had happened to their recommendations?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing. I have no knowledge of what happened to this study after it reached the Secretary of Defense.

RELATIONSHIP OF UNITED STATES TO UN IN KOREAN CONFLICT

The CHAIRMAN. Did the original prohibition against taking this action that you received, did that purport to be an order to you from the American Government or a finding of the United Nations?

General MACARTHUR. The agreement that was apparently made between the United Nations and the United States Government was that the United States Government should be the agent for the United Nations in the campaign in Korea.

The orders that came to me were from the American Government, but they had under that basis the validity of both the United States Government and the United Nations, I would assume.

The entire control of the campaign in Korea was in the hands of the American Government as the agent for the United Nations. That is my understanding of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you ever advised by any of the Joint Chiefs or through official or unofficial communication or by the Commander in Chief on the occasion of your meeting with him at Wake Island, of any steps that were taken to get the approval of the United Nations of any of the military plans that were formulated on behalf of the United States Government?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever. I think the very agreement was that the United States Government would run the campaign as they had the great mass of responsibility and the forces.

It was a perfectly logical thing that they should exercise the authority.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a great many more questions, but I have already asked too many because the members of my committee are all anxious. They have questions of their own that have been raised in their minds.

Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I will defer.

General MACARTHUR. If you can get 3 or 4 days off, go over to Korea. You will learn more in 48 hours in that atmosphere than you will learn in 48 weeks at this distance. They would give you the heartiest of welcome, and you would have an indelible impression. You have been playing with soldiers long enough to be something of a soldier yourself.

The CHAIRMAN. Even though I was only an apprentice seaman in the United States Navy in World War I, one of the highlights of my experience was the week I spent with you in Port Moresby in your headquarters in 1943 when cleaning up New Guinea.

I do not want to go to Korea right now, General, because I am trying to be objective in this matter, and I know that any man that gets over there with troops and under fire would immediately go to shouting for airplanes, more troops, blockade the coast, bomb the Chinese. Because when a man is under fire in the Pacific area, that is the most important thing in the world.

CONDITIONS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Was there any condition on this order from the Joint Chiefs, General?

General MACARTHUR. Was there any what?

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any condition on this order from the Joint Chiefs?

General MACARTHUR. Any condition?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Was the blockade not to be enforced unless you evacuated Korea?

General MACARTHUR. What I read is the extract from that report, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And there is no limitation on the time that it was to be put into effect, or conditions rather? Was there any limitation that it was not to be effective unless you were compelled to evacuate Korea?

General MACARTHUR. The only conditions were those I read, sir.

Do you wish me to read it again?

The CHAIRMAN. If you would be good enough, General.

General MACARTHUR (reading):

Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

Remove now any restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the one that said, "depending upon the circumstances"—if I understand the reading of it—I wish to assure you I have not seen that document—

General MACARTHUR. That reads, Senator:

Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized.

That was January 12, when we were regrouping our forces after the attack by the Chinese Red Army—

Or when we have evacuated Korea and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

That is the wording.

The CHAIRMAN. That, I suppose, was designed to give you the fullest freedom of action when it says "depending upon the circumstances then obtaining." I don't know what other purpose those words could have. Well, that, of course, relates to a construction.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMENDED ONLY RECONNAISSANCE—NOT BOMBING

There has been considerable—I won't say considerable—but there has been some confusion about some parts of your address, General. In one of them you referred to reconnaissance over China and in the other to bombing in Manchuria.

As I recall your address, in your four points you had reconnaissance and then later on you referred to attacking these bases in Manchuria.

Did you understand the order of the Joint Chiefs or the proposal of the Joint Chiefs, I might say, to relate to reconnaissance or to an attack on bases?

General MACARTHUR. This paper, they had, that I just read from?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General MACARTHUR. It says:

Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

The CHAIRMAN. There is quite a difference between reconnaissance and attack, is there not?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Joint Chiefs ever suggest in addition to the reconnaissance that these bases be attacked?

General MACARTHUR. Not that I know of, Senator; the only order I had was not to attack.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Did you construe your original orders to prohibit you from retaliating against Soviet air forces or the Soviets in any manner favorable to you in the event the Soviets intervened in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. Most explicitly I was prohibited from bombing any place beyond the area of Korea.
(The following matter was originally deleted, but Secretary Marshall later informed the committee that General MacArthur's statement on this subject could be released, and it follows hereunder.)

PROHIBITION ON BOMBING RACIN

I might say in that connection that additional restrictions were placed upon it. For instance, I was very anxious to bomb Racin. That is in northeast Korea. It is the great central distributing point from Manchuria down the east coast of Korea. It is perhaps 35 miles within North Korea.

I was very anxious to destroy that. Its usefulness to the enemy was self-evident. Great accumulations, depot accumulations, were made there. It was a great distributing center. That could run—the Soviets could run stuff from Vladivostok right down there.

We asked to bomb that, and we were forbidden.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that was within North Korea?

General MACARTHUR. That is in North Korea, sir, 35 miles this side of the Soviet border. I made the last request along that line—General Stratemeyer, a very magnificent air commander, insisted that that place should be taken out. It was vital. It was forbidden in some original directives. Other things were forbidden, which were within Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. Will it disturb you if when I have something I wanted to ask if I interrupt?

That was forbidden specifically in one of your original directives? General MACARTHUR. One of the original directives that I recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any reason given as to why this town in North Korea should not be bombed?

General MACARTHUR. I don't recall, Senator, but the reason seemed to me to be self-evident. They wished to avoid friction with the Soviets.

Now, to go back to Racin, under the insistence of the Air, I submitted that recently, shortly before my recall, and it was preemptorily refused and no reasons given.

The CHAIRMAN. That is within 35 miles of the Soviet frontier, rather than—

General MACARTHUR. That is up in the northeast, sir, opposite the Soviet border there, and my guess is about 35 miles this side of the border.

Senator Lodge. Could we get the name of that place for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell that town?

General WHITNEY. R-a-c-i-n. That is the closest I can come to it.

General MACARTHUR. If you have a map of Korea, I can point it out to you.

Of course, the hydroelectric plants were also—we were forbidden to bomb. Now, the ones in the northeast there were of little efficacy. When we overran them, they had been, many of the generators had been removed and it looked as though the plants hadn't been in operation for several months. The destruction of them—much of the machinery had been removed from the plants, but our operations had been so rapid the Soviets had been unable to get it across the border.

Up in the northwest, along the Yalu itself, the Air on a number of occasions wished to bomb it, but we never had authority to do so. Just how much those plants contribute to the Manchurian industry would be speculative.

The CHAIRMAN. Going back to this place of Racin, General, was it possible to bomb that objective without crossing the Soviet frontier?

General MACARTHUR. Oh, yes, sir. No one would have been more opposed to doing any bombing in Siberia than I would.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean bombing—I mean on your approach and after delivery of the bombs.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; there was no possibility of crossing the border. It was well within the area, and had we bombed, we would have been solicitous to do so in clear weather so there could have been no mistake.

I had the most definite assurances from the Air that there could be no possibility of error.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever formally submitted a request to bomb that objective until this request just prior to your return to the States?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir; that was formally submitted. I submitted in a radio the entire recommendation of General Stratemeyer and asked, in view of changed conditions, if we could not proceed to bomb.

There was no explanation given and whether that decision was made in the Defense Department or the State Department is a matter of conjecture on my part.

The CHAIRMAN. About when was that request first submitted, General?

General MACARTHUR. I should say that that request was probably submitted some time in February, perhaps in March. I haven't my files with me, so I couldn't tell you.

[Deleted.]

INTELLIGENCE ON CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTACK

The CHAIRMAN. General, did your intelligence have any previous knowledge of the fact that the Chinese were crossing the boundaries in any considerable force, prior to the attack, and our reversals in North Korea, last December?

General MACARTHUR. We had knowledge that the Chinese Communists had collected large forces along the Yalu River. My own reconnaissance, you understand, was limited entirely to Korea; but the general information which was available, from China and other places, indicated large accumulations of troops.

The Red Chinese, at that time, were putting out, almost daily, statements that they were not intervening, that these were volunteers only. About the middle of September our Secretary of State announced that he thought there was little chance, and no logic, in Chinese intervention.

In November, our Central Intelligence Agency, here, had said that they felt there was little chance of any major intervention on the part of the Chinese forces.

Now, we, ourselves, on the front, realized that the North Korean forces were being stiffened, and our intelligence, made just before General Walker launched his attacks, indicated they thought from 40,000 to 60,000 men might be down there.

Now, you must understand that the intelligence that a nation is going to launch war, is not an intelligence that is available to a commander, limited to a small area of combat.

That intelligence should have been given to me.

The agencies that the controlling powers had, which received reports from all over the world, from all the nations of the world, which had it—the British Secret Service had every secret service of any of the Allies at his disposal, which were not at mine, gave a much wider and a much broader basis upon which to make those concepts.

DISPOSITION OF OUR TROOPS AT TIME OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTACK

The CHAIRMAN. So, the disposition of the forces in the field, then, were based upon the assumption that there would be no intervention by a considerable number of Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

You are not correct in that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked a question; I did not make a statement. General MACARTHUR. The disposition of the forces was made upon the basis of the enemy that existed, and the orders that I had to defeat them.

That enemy was the North Korean group, and our forces had practically destroyed them. We would have completely destroyed them, if the Chinese had not intervened.

We were limited, as I say, by the two conditions: The size of the force I had; and the mission that was given me.

My mission was to clear out all North Korea, to unify it and to liberalize it.

The number of troops I had was limited, and those conditions indicated the disposition of the troops I had.

As a matter of fact, the disposition of those troops, in my opinion, could not have been improved upon, had I known the Chinese were going to attack.

The difficulty that arose was not the disposition of the troops, but the overwhelming number of the enemy forces, and the extraordinary limitations that were placed upon me in the use of my air.

LIMITATIONS ON USE OF AIR POWER IN KOREA

Had I been permitted to use my air, when those Chinese forces came in there, I haven't the faintest doubt we would have thrown them back.

That opinion is shared not only by every air officer I have commented to, but by General Stratemeyer, and General O'Donnell, who had my bombers, and everybody else—but we were not permitted to use our air against those troops; thousands and hundreds of thousands of troops were permitted to concentrate on the Yalu at that time, only two nights' march down to the front lines.

Probably the great mass of those Chinese troops moved down after we had started our reconnaissance in force, north.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I do not know anything about the military part of it, but it does not seem to me that we would have bombed them before they came in. That is the thing I did not understand about it.

General MACARTHUR. What is that, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. You said if you had been permitted to bomb them before they crossed the Yalu; but the Chinese Army—General MACARTHUR. If I had been permitted to bomb them before they crossed the Yalu, Senator, they would never have crossed.

The CHAIRMAN. I can understand that.

General MACARTHUR. Correct. If I had been permitted to bomb back of their bases, when they crossed the Yalu, they would have been—their logistical supply would have been cut off so rapidly that they would not have been able to advance with any degree of force or strength against the Eighth Army.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Of course, I can see the handicap you were under in not bombing them before they crossed; but it would have been—

General MACARTHUR. As a matter of fact—

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). A rather dangerous thing to bomb them before they crossed.

General MACARTHUR. As soon as we realized that the Chinese were moving across the Yalu in force as a national—as national entities, I ordered the bridge across the Yalu bombed from the Korean side, halfway to the stream. That order was countermanded from Washington, and it was only when I protested violently that I was allowed to continue my original directive.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, are the forces in Korea at the present time permitted to bomb half of the bridge from the center of the river over to North Korea?

General MACARTHUR. When I left they were; yes, sir; and I was bombing them.

The CHAIRMAN. Those people have had some good experience in pinpoint bombing, I assume.

General MACARTHUR. The original order, General Whitney, just recalled to me, directed me to confine the bombing along the Yalu river to 5 miles within North Korea, from the Yalu border—from the border of North Korea 5 miles inland, I was not permitted to bomb. That was changed, as I say, when, on my recommendation—

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you correctly, General, when you said you, had you known the Red Chinese were coming in in great force, that you would have had exactly the same disposition of troops that you did have?

General MACARTHUR. I don't see how I could have done anything else, Senator.

You understand, it was a calculated risk from the day we landed in Korea whether China or the Soviet would intervene.

In the face of that risk, which I had nothing to do with, you understand, I was ordered with these forces I had to clear North Korea.

I understood the dangers every day as nobody else, perhaps, understood them, but I had my directives, and I was implementing, to the best of my ability; this was a calculated risk. Every step that was taken, every tactical movement, and disposition of those troops was reported to Washington, and approved by Washington. There was no other way, when we had to clear the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, to clear North Korea, but to go north.

NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE TO ASCERTAIN ENEMY'S STRENGTH

Now, when the doubt arose as to whether the enemy was concentrating great forces there, we had three alternatives: One was to ascertain the truth of the strength of what he had; the other was to sit where we were. Had we done that he would have built up his forces, and undoubtedly destroyed us.

The third was to go in precipitate retreat, which would not have been countenanced, I am quite sure.

Now, what we actually did was to move forward to ascertain the strength of the enemy's forces.

When we moved forward, I had already prepared, and the troops had in their hands the order for retreat if we found the enemy in force. What we did was really a reconnaissance in force. It was the only way we had to find out what the enemy had and what his intentions were.

STRATEGIC WITHDRAWAL

When we moved forward we struck him in tremendous force—or he struck us, and we withdrew. The concept that our forces withdrew in disorder or were badly defeated is one of the most violent prevarications of truth that ever was made. Those forces withdrew in magnificent order and shape. It was a planned withdrawal from the beginning. The forces in the northeast, the Tenth Corps, were withdrawn in the same way.

The losses that we had in that withdrawal were less than the losses we had in our victorious attack at Inchon.

The whole reversal of the movement was a strategic one. As I have said frequently, that, with the inhibitions that are made there, the narrowness of that terrain in that campaign, all you can do is to go up and down like an accordion to an indecisive campaign and to an approximation of a stalemate. That was inherent from the beginning.

If I had known the Chinese troops were there I couldn't have done any differently. If I had started the withdrawal—it is exactly what I did, just as soon as we ascertained the truth and the plans were all made.

ISSUANCE OF WARNING TO COMMUNIST CHINA AGAINST INTERVENTION IN KOREA

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now going back to the concentration on the other side of the Yalu—of course, you would not have advised that they be bombed until they had disclosed their hand, that they were coming into the war and thereby precipitate a contest between Red China and ourselves, would you, General?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, you ask me what I would do; I will tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General MACARTHUR. When that formation of troops, that extraordinary groupment of troops—those are the troops that threatened Formosa. When they were withdrawn up there, I would have warned China that, if she intervened, we would have regarded it as war and we would have bombed her and taken every possible step to prevent it. That is what I would have done, and it seems to me that is what common sense would have dictated should have been done.

The CHAIRMAN. I have considerable sympathy with that statement, although I am trying to be objective.

Do you know whether or not any such warning was given to the Red Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. None that I know of.

POSITION OF FORMOSA

The CHAIRMAN. I did not understand exactly what you would have done about the Nationalist troops. You made some statement about what you would have done with the Chinese Nationalists at that juncture. You meant the way you would warn the Chinese Reds, I assume.

General MACARTHUR. When I received orders that I was to prevent, with the Seventh Fleet and my air, any invasion of Formosa, and reciprocally prevent the Nationalist Chinese troops from leaving Formosa to attack the mainland, there was a concentration of Red Chinese troops on the mainland, which threatened Formosa seriously. Those troops were the Fourth and the Third Field Armies which afterward showed up in North Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you think the inhibition imposed on the Nationalists by the President, of the Seventh Fleet, and the order to prevent any movement either way in between Formosa and China was responsible for unleashing, or at least making available these Third and Fourth Armies?

General MACARTHUR. No, Senator, I didn't say any such thing. If you will let me finish—

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, General, I thought you had completed.

REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON CHINESE NATIONALIST TROOPS

General MACARTHUR. I said that these troops down there threatened Formosa at that time. At that time Formosa—it was necessary for the generalissimo's troops to be held in Formosa for its defense. As these troops were moved north and the threat to Formosa disappeared, it became quite evident there was no necessity to keep the generalissimo's troops tied up on Formosa. As soon as it became known these troops had moved up north and were attacking me—the Third and Fourth Field Armies—I recommended to Washington that the traps be taken off the generalissimo, that he be furnished such logistical support as would put those troops in fighting trim, and that he be permitted to use his own judgment as to their use. The slightest use that was made of those troops would have taken the pressure off my troops. It would have saved me thousands of lives up there—even a threat of that.

We were at that time with the Seventh Fleet supporting my fighting line and doing everything else in Korea that was possible, bombarding and everything else, at the same time with the other hand they were holding back these troops, which, if they had been used, or even threatened to be used, would have taken the pressure off my front.

It was at that time that I made the recommendation that the generalissimo's troops be brought into play against the common enemy. The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any reply to that request, or was it vetoed?

General MACARTHUR. I don't think I received any reply, as far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. There was never any expression of approval or disapproval from the Defense Establishment, even though your forces were under terrific pressure?

General MACARTHUR. As far as I recall, there was nothing, no reply. I certainly didn't receive any affirmative reply. It was after

that, on or about the same time, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff made this similar, made exactly the same recommendation, on January 12.

STRENGTH OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

The CHAIRMAN. General, would you mind advising the committee and the Senate what you think is the real strength of the generalissimo's forces on Formosa? We have received a great many conflicting statements on that.

General MACARTHUR. I can tell you with considerable responsibility, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be happy to have you.

General MACARTHUR. I went down to Formosa. When I visited Formosa, the week before that, I had been receiving reports from the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressing trepidation for the safety of Formosa, and I reported back that under those conditions, hard pressed as I was in Korea at that time, that I would go down there and make a personal reconnaissance. I went down there, and within the limit of time I spent there, I got very definite impressions. The generalissimo has probably in the neighborhood of a half million troops. The personnel is excellent. They are just exactly the same as these Red troops I am fighting. They have a good morale. Their material equipment is spotty. They lack artillery. They lack trucks. They lack a great many of the modern refinements. They are capable of being made into a very excellent force. And their air—I should say they probably have between 200 and 250 planes. Their pilots are rather good. And for such a jerk-water group, they make a pretty brave showing.

Their navy is not a navy. It is a conglomeration of small ships. I went aboard one or two of them. They looked rather smart, but they are only capable of small coastal work, but the force represents a potential of a half million first-class fighting men.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you say that their equipment compared with that of the Chinese Communists who struck us in North Korea. General MACARTHUR. I would say when I saw them it was inferior to it.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR NATIONALIST TROOPS

The CHAIRMAN. Did they furnish you any estimate as to the amount of equipment that would be necessary?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I furnished them.

The CHAIRMAN. You furnished them?

General MACARTHUR. When I went down there I recommended at once to the Joint Chiefs that a professional mission be permitted to go down there to make a study, and I sent a group of officers under General Fox.

The CHAIRMAN. General who?

General MACARTHUR. General Fox. He was one of the deputy chiefs of staff of the Far East Command, and they made a comprehensive study of what would be essential to put those forces in fighting trim.

That report was a very compendious one, was submitted to Washington. In general it was approved and it is my understanding that it is being carried out now, being implemented.

The CHAIRMAN. Did General Fox's report have any estimate as to the time that would be required to teach these men to use their weapons.

General MACARTHUR. We recommended on that mission that a military mission should go with these supplies to insure their proper distribution and to insure the proper training in them. I think it went down to the battalion strength.

My own estimate would be, after the material was there, that those troops would be in very good shape, probably as good as they ever could be made outside of combat, within 4 months.

USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS ON CHINA MAINLAND

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your opinion that if we had in the past, or during the future seen fit to carry out this recommendation and equip these troops and supply them the means of reaching the mainland of China, they could maintain themselves there?

General MACARTHUR. As to their use, Senator, there is no question that such a decision should be left to their commander. The possibility of a huge amphibious force landing all that crowd on the mainland might not be feasible. They could be used in various ways. They could infiltrate into Indochina. They could go in small forays and come back or they could go to the mainland just exactly as they came to Formosa, in their own junks and so on.

At that time when they crossed the straights there into Formosa, the Red enemy was not able to stop them. He did not have enough air, he did not have enough navy to stop them, and with the protection that naturally comes from our aid and our navy, if he moved from the mainland to Formosa, I fancy he could move back from Formosa to the mainland, but whether that would be the most efficient use of those troops, I would hesitate to say.

The Chinese are peculiar in their own methods. They have their own ideas. They know their terrain. They know their potentialities. That is a subject that should be left up to the commander in chief of the Chinese forces. I would not attempt to speculate how those troops should be used, but this I do know: They should be used.

Even as a threat they would have relieved the pressure on my command. It would have been a 100-percent different picture if they had not been held in leash.

AREA WHERE CHINESE NATIONALIST TROOPS COULD BEST BE USED

The CHAIRMAN. General, I had considerable sympathy with the original rejection of the use of the Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea at the outset until the Chinese Reds intervened. I thought that that would be very provocative. I do not know what your views were on that.

General MACARTHUR. At that time, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. When Formosa was threatened by the Chinese Communists, the best use that could have been made of those troops was to leave them right in Formosa, but the minute that threat was relieved, those troops should have been utilized in such ways as might have seemed best.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, would it be possible to augment the forces in Korea by some of the Chinese troops or is that feasible, or should they be left in Formosa? Would they have a greater value in Formosa now that Red China has intervened in the war?

General MACARTHUR. I think that we could use some of them to great advantage in Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever make any recommendation after the Chinese Communists intervened in the war, that we accept the offer of the generalissimo of the original 35,000?

General MACARTHUR. I did. I recommended that we should utilize those troops.

The CHAIRMAN. In Korea?

General MACARTHUR. I have forgotten whether I said in Korea. Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, while General MacArthur is consulting the memorandum, what is going to be your policy? I notice that we have practically a quorum of the Senate here.

The CHAIRMAN. I have sent a message to the majority leader and requested the members of the committee be excused, Senator McMahon. I have not heard from them. I do not know whether there will be anyone there to excuse them or not, but I have sent that request over.

[Deleted.]

General MACARTHUR (continuing). [Deleted.]

That is the only communication I ever received on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that received from the Defense Establishment or from the State Department?

General MACARTHUR. Who originated it I do not know, sir. It came through the Department of the Army, but the State Department does not deal directly, did not deal directly, with the theater commander.

The channel of communication, as I said before, was the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Staff of the Army is the immediate agent thereof. Where this originated, what happened here I haven't the faintest idea.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to apologize to all of my colleagues on the committee for having taken so much time in this examination. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I just have two brief questions and I will reserve the other questions.

DATE OF JCS RECOMMENDATIONS

General, what is the date of that Joint Chiefs of Staff statement there that you read a little while ago?

General MACARTHUR. The one with the four conditions? That was January 12, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Of what year?

General MACARTHUR. 1951.

Senator CONNALLY. In which they pointed out their recommendations? I am speaking about the Joint Chiefs. You read a statement earlier in your testimony.

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. It was January 12, 1951.

Senator CONNALLY. Is that the one that you had reference to in your address to the Congress in which you said the Joint Chiefs had approved your plans and so on?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir, and many other things in which we were in entire agreement.

Senator CONNALLY. I know, but that particular—

General MACARTHUR. That is what I had reference to; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. That is what you had reference to?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator CONNALLY. I want to defer my other question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bridges.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF DISMISSAL

Senator BRIDGES. General MacArthur, do you question the right of the President of the United States to dismiss you? Did you or do you now?

General MACARTHUR. You mean to recall me?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. Not in the slightest. The authority of the President to assign officers or to reassign them is complete and absolute. He does not have to give any reasons therefor or anything else. That is inherent in our system.

Senator BRIDGES. How did you first receive word of your recall?

General MACARTHUR. I received it from my wife. One of my aides had heard the broadcast and instantly told her, and she informed me. Senator BRIDGES. You received it via the radio before you had any official notice?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. How long after your aide had told Mrs. MacArthur that he had heard it on the radio did you receive your official communication?

General MACARTHUR. Oh, I should say within 30 minutes, perhaps, or an hour. I couldn't tell you.

Senator BRIDGES. Were you recalled with the action to take effect summarily, immediately?

General MACARTHUR. The order relieved me of the command upon receipt.

Senator BRIDGES. Is that a customary procedure?

General MACARTHUR. I have never known it in the American Army, and I know of no precedence any place. Being summarily relieved in that way made it impossible to carry out directives that I was working on at that moment. I had to turn them over to my successor, an admirable officer in every respect, General Ridgway, who was 350 miles away on the Korean front.

I don't think there is any question that the interest of the United States was jeopardized in such a summary mode of turning over great responsibilities which involve the security of the country.

Senator BRIDGES. And is it customary in the recall or relief of a commander, to do it in such a manner that he will be able to turn over his command over to his successor and brief him upon the current status of the operation?

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably.

RECORD OF WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

Senator BRIDGES. General, you were present on Wake Island, were you not, at a conference with the President and certain other high officials in this country?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Was there a stenographic report made of that conference?

General MACARTHUR. There was no official stenographic report. I asked Mr. Ross, who was in charge of public relations, whether there should be stenographic notes taken, because I wished to take them myself, but he told me that no notes would be taken, and there was no stenographer present.

I have heard within the last 48 hours that apparently a stenographer in an adjacent room took down some notes, but I have no knowledge of it.

Senator BRIDGES. And you were not aware that a stenographer was sequestered in another room?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. On the contrary, after the conference, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Ross, perhaps others, worked up a communique which was to be issued covering the reports as to what took place. That communique was submitted to the President and approved, and submitted to me, and I initialed it.

Senator BRIDGES. When the conference was held in the room, were the voices normal voices, or were you engaged in discussion that reached a high level, a high pitch at the time?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I think it was a small table and a dozen men were around it—the ordinary conversational tone of voice. There would have to have been a lot of eavesdropping to get any report by anyone that wasn't in that room.

Senator BRIDGES. Did you get rumors over there, or reports that there was sentiment among certain of our Allies in the United Nations favoring your recall?

General MACARTHUR. I was not aware of any movement, either internationally or nationally, that involved my recall. No information whatsoever had reached me. I understand since that there were there was a considerable amount of talk in the papers, but I had received nothing that I recall. I had not received the slightest information that the matter was under discussion in Washington.

I was not even aware that there was any divergence of basic thought between myself militarily and Washington.

CARRYING OUT MILITARY ORDERS

Senator BRIDGES. Have you ever, to your knowledge, refused to carry out a military order given you?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, I have been a soldier for 52 years. I have in that time, to the best of my ability, carried out every order that was ever given me. No more subordinate soldier has ever worn the American uniform.

I would repudiate any concept that I wouldn't carry out any order that was given me. If you mean to say that the orders I have carried out I was in agreement with, that is a different matter.

Many of the orders that I have received, I have disagreed with them, both their wisdom and their judgment; but that did not affect in the slightest degree my implementing them to the very best and maximum of my ability.

Any insinuation by anyone, however high his office, that I have ever in any way failed, to the level of my ability, to carry out my instructions, is completely unworthy and unwarranted.

Senator BRIDGES. I do not want to take any more time, Mr. Chairman, because others want to ask questions. I will have other questions later.

NOTES OF THE WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN. If the committee does not object, in order to preserve a little continuity here, I would like to ask the General if he ever received from General Bradley five copies of these, what purported to be, notes of the Wake Island meeting.

General MACARTHUR. I received from General Bradley, I don't know whether there were five copies, I think some time in December, what were purported to be the recollection of the Washington group of what took place at Wake Island. I didn't—if I remember correctly—I filed the copies; I didn't even check them.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg pardon? General MACARTHUR. I said I did not read the copies—the copy that was sent me. I merely put it in the file. I have no idea of whether it was authentic or whether it represented it or not. By that time, Senator, that incident was about as dead as the dodo bird. They had no bearing on what was taking place in Korea then.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the documents in the Wake Island, the purported documents of the Wake Island hearing?

General MACARTHUR. That is what I am referring to, yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. General Bradley's letter, as I recall, stated that it was forwarded to you in October 1950, and was receipted for by some member of your staff a few days later, well within October.

Senator SPARKMAN. October 27.

The CHAIRMAN. October 27.

Do you know whether or not those documents that General Bradley forwarded to you, were received?

General MACARTHUR. It could have been in October. I have no doubt they are the documents that are referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time the committee first received the expurgated edition of those notes, or whatever they were, I did not know that they had ever been brought to your attention, so I mailed you a copy.

I hope you received that.

General MACARTHUR. Thank you very much, Senator.

I got the copy just as I was stepping into the plane, so have not had a chance to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are not in position to advise the committee as to whether the purported notes of the meeting are accurate or inaccurate.

General MACARTHUR. I don't know, sir. I had no stenographic notes myself, and I have explained the circumstances under which they were composed.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are not in position to state whether or not there are inaccuracies in that report or whether it is a reasonably accurate statement of what transpired on Wake Island?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; I have no way of telling you that. I have no doubt that in general they are an accurate report of what took place.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. I will waive at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. General, I just want to ask a few questions and I hope to have the privilege of asking a few later on.

At the Wake Island conference the papers reported that you and the President walked apart. Is that right? You had a conference just between yourselves?

General MACARTHUR. When I met the President, we were taken to one of the small homes there. The President wanted to see me alone and we talked there possibly three quarters of an hour with no one else present.

Senator WILEY. Then—

General MACARTHUR. We then went later on to the conference room where there was this formal conference.

Senator WILEY. The reason I asked is that I think the memorandum you spoke about mentioned here the recollection of the President and others, too; so that we have got this straight.

INHIBITIONS ON CONDUCT OF WAR IN KOREA

Now, too, you mentioned in your testimony that the inhibitions that were given you were without precedent. Do you want to amplify that?

General MACARTHUR. I think, Senator, they are so well known that unless somebody wishes me to, I have no desire to amplify them.

Senator WILEY. They were in the beginning, these inhibitions?

General MACARTHUR. They were and still exist.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. Have you ever advocated the invasion of the Chinese mainland by United States ground forces?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, you know that is ridiculous. No man in his proper senses would advocate throwing our troops in on the Chinese mainland. I have never heard that advocated by anybody at any time. That is, any military man.

POLITICAL DECISIONS IN KOREA

Senator WILEY. You have indicated in your public addresses that there has been a failure to take certain needed political decisions in the Korean matter. Can you tell us what you think those decisions might well have been?

General MACARTHUR. I can tell you what I would have done.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. I would have served—as soon as it became apparent that Red China was throwing the full might of its military force against our troops in Korea, I would have served warning on her that if she did not within a reasonable time discuss a cease-fire

order, that the entire force of the United Nations would be utilized to bring to an end the predatory attack of her forces on ours.

In other words, I would have supplied her with an ultimatum that she would either come and talk terms of a cease fire within a reasonable period of time or her actions in Korea would be regarded as a declaration of war against the nations engaged there and that those nations would take such steps as they felt necessary to bring the thing to a conclusion. That is what I would have done, and I would still do it, Senator.

Senator WILEY. Have you ever been embarrassed as commanding general in Korea by the actions or policies of any of your UN partners in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever. The United Nations, the various nations who have contributed there, the troops, the actual commands there, have been splendid in every respect.

REASONS FOR RECALL

Senator WILEY. General, when you were recalled when the message came through, were there any reasons assigned to your recall?

General MACARTHUR. The only reasons were contained in the order that I received and the reason that was given was that it was felt that I could not give my complete support to the policies of the United States and of the United Nations.

That reason seems to be to me—there was no necessity to give any reason.

Senator WILEY. I understand.

General MACARTHUR. But it seems to me to be completely invalid. I have not carried out every directive that I have ever received, but what I was trying to do was to find out what the directives were to be for the future.

OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

I was operating in what I call a vacuum. I could hardly have been said to be in opposition to policies which I was not aware of even. I don't know what the policy is now. You have various potentials:

First is that you can go on and complete this war in the normal way and bring about just and honorable peace at the soonest time possible with the least loss of life by utilizing all of your potential.

The second is that you bring this thing to an end in Korea by yielding to the enemy's terms and on his terms.

The third is that you go on indecisively, fighting, with no mission for the troops except to resist and fight in this accordion fashion—up and down—which means that your cumulative losses are going to be staggering. It isn't just dust that is settling in Korea, Senator; it is American blood.

Now, my whole effort has been since Red China came in there to get some definition, military definition, of what I should do. There has been no change from the directions that I had—to clear North Korea.

As far as the United Nations are concerned, as far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, my directives have been changed and I have been informed that my main objective, which takes precedence

over everything else, was the security of my forces and the protection of Japan. And I have been operating on that.

Now, that is not a mission.

Now, when you say that I have enunciated my recommendations, they are plain and clear. The only reason that you can logically say that I would disagree was the concept that something else than what I recommended was going to be done.

Now, I don't know what is going to be done, but I can assure you had I stayed in command, whatever was ordered to be done I would have done it to the best of my ability.

Senator WILEY. General, when were you appointed to take over Japan, so to speak? What was the date you went to Japan?

General MACARTHUR. My appointment as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, as I recall, was made either on August 14 or August 15.

Senator WILEY. How many years previously thereto had you lived in the Far East?

General MACARTHUR. My professional career has extended over a half-century, and more. I think that my foreign service, Senator, amounts to about 24 years on foreign service, nearly half.

CONSULTATION ON CHINA POLICY

Senator WILEY. Now, after you were appointed to the position in Japan, there began a systematic utilization of folks in America to try to formulate some kind of a Chinese policy.

Were you ever consulted?

General MACARTHUR. The Congress of the United States did me the very signal and high honor of asking my views; and while the pressure of my duties in Japan did not permit my coming here, I did make a report to the Congress in 1947, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

As far as any consultation on the future of China, by Washington authorities, outside of the legislative branch, the answer is in the negative.

My views have never been required.

Senator WILEY. Has the State Department ever consulted with you when they were sending General Marshall or General Hurley or sending the others over there?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever.

Senator WILEY. Did you ever receive any requests from anybody in Government, outside of the legislative branch, that were mentioned for your views on, or as to how to handle the far eastern situation?

General MACARTHUR. No official request.

A great many personal friends of mine have written me and discussed it with me, but no official request, so far as I recall.

Senator WILEY. What I am getting at, there, is this:

Do you know of any man in America that has had the vast experience that you have had in the Orient, getting acquainted with various nations in the Orient? Do you know of any other man that has lived there so long, or known the various factors and various backgrounds of the peoples, and their philosophy, as yourself?

General MACARTHUR. That is a very flattering estimate you make, Senator.

I think that I have probably lived in the Far East as long as anybody that I know of, in an official position in the United States.

Whether I have profited by it, by the wisdom that you imply, is something else again.

Senator WHEAT. Well, let me put it to you another way:

When you were in Japan, were you cognizant of the internal affairs that were going on in Russia, China—the fight between the Communies and the Nationalists?

General MACARTHUR. Naturally.

Senator WHEAT. And, you were—
General MACARTHUR. For 5½ years, Senator, I have had to govern Japan. I was provided, by the nations concerned—I, as the sole executive authority for Japan; so naturally the scope of my duties were complete and enveloping, as far as the Far East was concerned and, to some extent, involved the entire world.

STOPPING COMMUNISM IN CHINA

Senator WHEAT. Did you have any idea at that time how the situation in China might have been solved, instead of running into the mess that we are in now?

General MACARTHUR. It is my own personal opinion that the greatest political mistake we made in a hundred years in the Pacific was in allowing the Communists to grow in power in China.

I think, at one stroke, we undid everything, starting from John Hay, through Taft, Leonard Wood, Woodrow Wilson, Henry Stimson, and all those great architects of our Pacific policy.

I believe it was fundamental, and I believe we will pay for it, for a century.

Senator WHEAT. Well, let us ask the direct question:

What would you have done—what would you have advised, under the circumstances that existed back there in 1945—what would you have done?

General MACARTHUR. I would have given such assistance to the conservative Government of China as to have checked the growing tide of communism.

A very little help and assistance, in my belief, at that time, would have accomplished that purpose.

Senator WHEAT. For a good many years you have been acquainted, I take it, with the Russians and with the Communist infiltration.

Would you have sought to have gotten those two forces together?
General MACARTHUR. I did not catch the question.

AMALGAMATION OF COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS IN CHINA

Senator WHEAT. Would you have sought to have amalgamated the Communies and Nationalists—have gotten them together?

General MACARTHUR. Just about as much chance of getting them together as that oil and water will mix.

Senator WHEAT. That was your idea at that time, too; was it not?
General MACARTHUR. It would have been then, and always. The whole history of the world shows that.

Senator WHEAT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, gentlemen, there are two reasons, I think, which make it appropriate for us to take a recess at this time. One of them is that we have had a rather late session; and the other is that there is an alleged demand for the presence of the Senators over in the Senate. I understand that a vote is about to be taken over there on some motion by Senator Wherry to bring up the Watkins' resolution.

I shall set the time of 2:30 for the reconvening of the committee this afternoon.

Just one moment, please. Some of you gentlemen came in after the initial statement was made. I wish—not because of what has been testified to here this morning—for the future, to remind you that you are especially charged in using good judgment in discussing matters that might affect the national security. I do not think there has been anything in particular here this morning, but there will be before these hearings are concluded.

We will reconvene at 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p. m., the committees recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., the same afternoon.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell (chairman), Connally, Wiley, Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Gillette, Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

Senator Byrd, I believe that you are the next in order.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I had some questions that I wanted to ask, but all of them have been so thoroughly discussed and knowing that the general wants to get through this evening and go away because of an engagement he has, I will restrain myself and not ask any questions.

General MACARTHUR. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am afraid that will be very sad news to some of the other members of the committee, General. We hoped we would have the pleasure of your company here perhaps after today. I know a number of the members of the committee—

General MACARTHUR. I would appreciate it very much if you could finish with me today, Senator. I have a lot of obligations. I am willing to sit until all hours.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize that, but I am sure you will understand how we are groping here to get all of the information that we possibly can on all aspects of this matter.

PROCEDURE FOR HEARINGS

Senator MORSE. May I raise a procedural point with the Chair. No one is more desirous than I am that we arrange our schedules to the utmost convenience of the committee and the general, but I think we ought to face the reality that it is just going to be physically impossible to finish with the general today.

We haven't even gone into a discussion of the exhibits that have been placed on file with this committee by the Defense Establishment, containing the paraphrasing of all the communications that have passed between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and the general; and I think if these hearings are to accomplish the purpose of getting the information that the American people are entitled to, we ought to realize it is going to take a considerable length of time to complete the examination of the general.

I would prefer that we work out some schedule with the general so that the examination may be completed in the days ahead, but I don't see how you can complete a cross-examination on the one exhibit that I studied last night, for example, in the office of the Armed Services Committee, in regard to the exchange of radiograms and cablegrams with the general—I don't see how you could complete an examination of that in less than a day.

Unless we go into this thoroughly, it is not going to be fair to the general, nor to the American people or any other party concerned.

I think we ought to settle right now whether we are going to try to put the pressure on here for a short examination by the members of the committee—I don't mean that the chairman would do that—but I mean whether or not any of us are to feel bound to conduct a short examination or whether we shall be able to go into this in detail. I don't think I can complete my examination of the general in less than 3 hours.

Senator CONNALLY. How long?

Senator MORSE. Less than 3 hours.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I have made every effort possible to accommodate the wishes of all parties at interest here—members of the committee and General MacArthur. I don't think, of course, it would be possible to conclude the hearings today. I think that would be manifestly impossible, because even if each Senator only took 5 minutes, we couldn't conclude it today.

We want to respect your wishes just as far as we possibly can, General, but we feel we have here a very vital matter that may mean life or death to the American people. You are not only probably the best informed man on some aspects of this matter who is available to us, but just now the American people respect your views, I think, more than they do perhaps any other living American.

As much as we dislike to inconvenience you in any way, I know that you will give this committee time to really develop this matter. I want to close the entire hearings as rapidly as possible as far as I am concerned, but I wish to do a thorough job while we are at it.

Since the question of open or closed hearings has arisen, we may have a vote this afternoon that would put us in open hearings. If it does, I anticipate that would take even more time.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I add one other point because I want the record to be perfectly clear as to the position of the junior Senator from Oregon.

SCHEDULE OF HEARINGS

I am very interested in working out a schedule with the general to meet his convenience to the maximum extent possible for the future convenience of the general and the committee, but there are many

other witnesses to be called, and I see no reason why we have to proceed in continuity until we complete our examination of the general.

If it is necessary for him to leave today, I see no reason why General Marshall could not be called tomorrow or on Monday. We could call General Collins or anybody else we want to call.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would not like to do that except as a last resort, Senator.

I think that while the committee can take that course and I would not be opposed to it if it is necessary to do it, if we can preserve the continuity of these hearings, I think it would be very helpful to us in arriving at the facts.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, permit me to express my opinion that I think the general ought also to be advised that undoubtedly he is going to have to be recalled after we hear some of these other witnesses, for rebuttal testimony. I imagine that there is going to be some conflict in the testimony among these witnesses.

I think he is entitled to know just what the plans of the committee will be concerning the examination.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that may be; but I do not think that we can take the position at this time that that is to be the case.

I am certainly not prepared to say he will be recalled. He may be. I do not know what turn the testimony is going to take.

Unfortunately, I have not even had an opportunity to read these various documents. I have not read all of the Wedemeyer report. I have run through it.

I have not read all of the Wake Island document, and I have not been able to read all of the matters submitted by the Department of Defense, though I stayed up until nearly 12 o'clock last night after a very strenuous day undertaking to familiarize myself with the various documents.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit one more word from me, I think what you have just said is a very important observation. That is why I feel it would be well that we taken an interim period here to study these documents. We are sitting here examining the general today on the broad question, as he should be examined upon it, but when you get into these detailed documents, then your examination is going to have to be in terms of specific exhibits.

I think we have to study those before we are in a position to examine the general.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose we proceed in order now, and if any Senator wishes to make a motion that an interruption of the hearings or any matter of that kind be done, we are prepared to continue with the hearings this afternoon and I do not think the committee ought to take any action on that question.

DEFINITION OF THE ISSUES

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, after listening to this exchange of ideas, would it not be a very simple process for us to ask the chairman and others to set down what the real issues here involved are?

To me we can clear away a lot of the maze and fog if we know just what the issues are. We have no resolution to base the issues. We come here, as it were, demanding open session, seeking the sky as the limit. Now, if we haven't the issue clearly in front of us, why I can

see where Senator Morse's explanation is clearly pertinent, but if we had some issues, do as they do in the practice of the courts now. The judge calls them up and says, "Agree on what you can agree and then define the issue." We can sort of litigate, as it were.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not want to prescribe the limitations of this hearing. If the Senator wishes to make a motion and does so this afternoon, I will appoint a committee and give equal representation to the majority and the minority, four members; let them get together and define the issues. I am not prepared to undertake any such chore at this time myself.

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, will not every Senator have his own ideas about what the issues are?

The CHAIRMAN. We will settle that. Now may we get along with the hearing.

Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. General, I have a few questions I would like to ask, if I may. I first want to take this opportunity to thank you for the courtesies you presented to me when I went to Japan in the fall of 1949 and asked for some help and guidance in getting around the area, and your advice as to where to go in order to get the feel of the area. I want to say here before I begin that in no way, shape, or manner did you try to influence any judgment I came to, and you gave me the opportunity and answered my questions. So whatever I say is simply in line with trying to bring out some of the things I am still not quite clear about.

COMMANDS HELD BY GENERAL MACARTHUR

In order to start, I would like to ask you, if I may, what are the different commands that you had in the Far East up to the time of this change that has just been made?

As I have it you had four or five different commands there. I would like to get for the record what those commands were. Will you give us that briefly?

General MACARTHUR. Fundamentally I was the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

Senator SMITH. That is known as SCAP?

General MACARTHUR. That is SCAP. That was an international office. I also held an international office as the United Nations commander in Korea. I was also the commander in chief of our forces in the Far East. I also commanded, this being a technical command, our ground forces in the Far East. I was also military governor of the Ryukyu Islands.

Senator SMITH. As I recall it in my conversation with you when I was there, there were different jurisdictions in the area. I mean Korea was one jurisdiction, the mainland of China, and you had certain responsibilities in the islands and so on. Could you define those jurisdictions?

General MACARTHUR. The supreme commander was limited entirely to Japan. He was the sole executive authority for the administration of Japan. He had no authorities whatsoever outside of the command of that area.

The commander in chief of the United Nations forces was in command in Korea. He had nothing to do except with the forces in

Korea, and those attributes which came from other sections, such as Japan.

The commander in chief in the Far East has the strategic control of the theater which embraces Japan, the Philippines, and the Ryukyus.

Senator SMITH. The island area?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any jurisdiction at all or responsibility over the mainland of China?

General MACARTHUR. When you were there I did not.

Senator SMITH. That is what I want to bring out.

General MACARTHUR. Since then it come under my general jurisdiction strategically.

Senator SMITH. Since the war started in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. But prior to the starting of the war in Korea, where was the jurisdiction over the mainland?

General MACARTHUR. I had no jurisdiction whatsoever over China.

Senator SMITH. Am I correct in my recollection that it is in the hands of the Navy so far as the United States is concerned?

General MACARTHUR. It was in the hands of the Navy operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JURISDICTION OVER KOREA PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF WAR

Senator SMITH. Now, moving over to Korea, if I recollect, prior to the outbreak of the war in Korea, you did not have general jurisdiction over Korea in any way.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir; I had no jurisdiction whatsoever over Korea.

Senator SMITH. What was the jurisdiction there? Am I correct that was from the State Department?

General MACARTHUR. The jurisdiction there was under the general control of the State Department, operating through the Ambassador. We had, in the military, a mission over there of about 500 officers and men, and they functioned, however, under the Ambassador, under the State Department.

My responsibilities were merely to feed them and clothe them in a domiciliary way. I had nothing whatsoever to do with the policies, the administration, or the command responsibilities in Korea until the war broke out.

Senator SMITH. Did you have anything to do with the policy that withdrew your troops or our troops from Korea prior to the outbreak of the war?

General MACARTHUR. That decision was made in Washington.

Senator SMITH. That decision was made in Washington; it had nothing to do with you or your command there?

General MACARTHUR. The troops were a part of my command at that time; they were the Twenty-fourth Corps.

Senator SMITH. Well, I was left with the impression that there were three different, you might say, jurisdictions there, such as your own on the islands; the Navy on the mainland of China, Formosa, and the State Department in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. That there was no one finger, politically speaking, you might say, on the pulse of the whole area?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Most of those decisions were cleared in Washington?

General MACARTHUR. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. They might or might not be in line with each other. General MACARTHUR. Any coordination was in Washington; it was not out in the local theaters.

Senator SMITH. Well now, let me ask you this further question then, General: Assuming there were differences of opinion between you and the Chiefs of Staff as to the strategy in Korea, what possible bearing did that have on your job as SCAP in Japan?

General MACARTHUR. It would have no direct bearing. It would only be indirect. As a matter of fact, I am not aware of having had any differences with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military questions at all.

REASONS FOR DISMISSAL FROM ALL COMMANDS

Senator SMITH. What I am trying to get at was what was the possible justification, assuming there was a difference of opinion, as you said this morning? The Commander in Chief, the President, could, of course, have the power to remove you as chief of the operations in Korea; but what relation did that have to your job in Japan, as the military government there, you might say, and as the man in charge of Japan?

General MACARTHUR. No direct relationship. They did dovetail into each other.

Senator SMITH. Dovetailed; but I am just trying to get, in my mind, the reason for your being removed from the job in Japan, especially when the Japanese peace treaty was on the fire, and when Mr. Dulles had just been out there, with you, discussing the Japanese peace treaty.

I want to relate that Japanese peace treaty to the picture.

What light can we get from you on that?

General MACARTHUR. I could not give you any light on that, Senator. I do not know.

The two commands were independent.

If your question is—whether I could have been relieved from the Korean command, without being relieved from the Japanese command, the answer, of course, is in the affirmative.

Senator SMITH. That was the purpose of my question, because I have been very much troubled on the SCAP situation. I am on the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Far East, and we have been discussing the Japanese peace treaty, and concerned with Mr. Dulles, and we thought that Mr. Dulles was dealing with you directly on the Japanese peace-treaty negotiations. That is the reason I raised the question.

CONSULTATION ON JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

I am wondering why you were removed from Japan—if you had any disagreement on the Japanese peace treaty, or anything of that sort?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever.

The basis that Mr. Dulles is working on now is 100 percent in coordination with my own ideas.

Senator SMITH. I am very glad indeed to hear that.

General MACARTHUR. I think that many of the concepts and bases for that treaty are my own.

Senator SMITH. I am very glad to hear that.

I wanted to get that straight with you. We still have the Japanese treaty before us, yet.

General MACARTHUR. There was no slightest friction whatsoever that I know of.

Senator SMITH. That is all I have for the present, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George not now being present, I will call on Senator Saltonstall.

POLICY IN KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. General MacArthur, might I ask you about three or four questions that appear to me as important?

Now, what it seems to me that we are trying to do is to get security for our country, our own country, and to get a peace, and a policy in the Far East.

I have been very much worried to try to find out what is our policy in the Far East, particularly with relation to Korea; and I read your speech in Chicago where, I think, you asked that same question twice.

Now, on April 15, the Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in a television and press broadcast, stated, in part—and this is the pertinent part of his speech, as I read it:

What we are trying to do is to maintain peace and security without a general war. We are saying to the aggressors, "You will not be allowed to get away with your crime. You must stop it."

At the same time, we are trying to prevent a general conflagration which would consume the very things we are now trying to defend.

I would appreciate it very much, with your knowledge of the Far East, if you will give me your opinion of that statement, and if that is a practical policy.

MILITARY APPEASEMENT OR VICTORY

General MACARTHUR. That policy, as you have read it, seems to me to introduce a new concept into military operations—the concept of appeasement, the concept that when you use force, you can limit that force.

The concept that I have is that when you go into war, you have exhausted all other potentialities of bringing the disagreements to an end.

As I understand what you read, that we would apply to the military situation in Korea certain military appeasements—that is, that we would not use our Air Forces to their maximum extent, only to the limited area of that Korea; that we would not use our Navy, except along the border lines of Korea.

To me, that would mean that you would have a continued and indefinite extension of bloodshed, which would have limitless—a limitless end.

You would not have the potentialities of destroying the enemy's military power, and bringing the conflict to a decisive close in the minimum of time, and with a minimum of loss.

It seems to me the worst possible concept, militarily, that we would simply stay there, resisting aggression, so-called, although I do not know what you mean by "resisting aggression."

The very term of "resisting aggression," it seems to me that you destroy the potentialities of the aggressor to continually hit you.

If that is the concept of a continued and indefinite campaign in Korea, with no definite purpose of stopping it until the enemy gets tired or you yield to his terms, I think that introduces into the military sphere a political control such as I have never known in my life or have ever studied.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, you feel that the Korean situation, having gone into an armed conflict, it should be brought to an end in the quickest possible way through a military victory.

General MACARTHUR. I do, Senator, exactly; and I believe if you do not do that, if you hit soft, if you practice appeasement in the use of force, you are doomed to disaster.

I believe that if you continue that way, you are inviting the very thing that you desire to stop—the spread of the conflict.

RESULT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then assuming that your four recommendations, as made in your address to Congress, were all adopted, what do you visualize as the result?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that if you carry that out, you stand the best chance that is possible of ending this war in the quickest time and with the least cost in blood.

In fact, I haven't seen any other proposal as to how you would expect to bring it to an end except by agreeing to the enemy's terms.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And you think that if your four recommendations were carried into effect, it would not necessarily spread the war into Manchuria and China, but by quick and effective action of our power, it would be sufficiently limited to Korea as to be brought to an end in that general vicinity?

General MACARTHUR. I don't think that if you apply the measures that I advocate, which were the measures that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on January 12, that you will necessarily confine the area of the conflict to Korea; but I believe it will give you an opportunity to hit the enemy where he is assembling to hit you.

DISCUSSION OF FORMOSA AT WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, may I ask this question on a slightly different subject. In this so-called Wake Island conference statement on page 8, on the printed copy, the President is quoted as saying this:

General MacArthur and I have talked fully about Formosa. There is no need to cover that subject again. The general and I are in complete agreement.

I believe that was also the purport of a communiqué issued at that time. Is that a fair statement of the President's and your position when you conferred on Formosa, if you care to say? That was a private communication, of course.

General MACARTHUR. I don't think the communiqué had any reference to Formosa, Senator, and I think that when the President said that he and I were in agreement about Formosa, that he meant the agreement was that both of us had dropped the question of discussing it there at Wake Island, at any other time.

The strategic situation of Formosa, its value, and its general relationship to security in the Far East was not discussed by me with the President.

Now, I would not feel at liberty to reveal what was discussed by the President with me in our conference before the main conference.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I respect that.

General MACARTHUR. But I do offer that explanation of what I am sure the President had in mind when he made that statement.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I respect your position with relation to your conference with the President.

I would say, most respectfully, that I would think that that statement, the interpretation of an ordinary person, particularly in Congress, would give that statement, "We are in complete accord," would lead to a different inference.

General MACARTHUR. I agree with you 100 percent, Senator; and the same concept hit me in Tokyo, and the next day I issued a statement through the spokesman in Tokyo stating that there had been absolutely no change on my part in any views I held as to the strategic value of Formosa.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS IN FAR EAST

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask you, sir, one more question. In your address to the Congress you stated that you felt that military necessity and the conduct of the war—and I think I quote you accurately from here on—"removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operation against the Chinese mainland."

My question is: Just what do you visualize this logistical support would amount to in the way of men, material, and ships, as well as air support?

General MACARTHUR. The quotation from my statement is incorrect, Senator. What I said was not with reference to the Chinese mainland, but what I said was against the common enemy. As I explained this morning—or tried to—the use of the troops, the Chinese Nationalist troops—should be left to the judgment of the Chinese commander in chief; and I tried to explain the various ways in which he might use those troops.

It is an absolutely incorrect statement, which I have great difficulty in comprehending why it was made, because I gave a copy of my statement to the Clerk of the Senate or the House, whoever was there, and it was recorded and you will find that there was a misquotation on it.

What I said was against the common enemy. I did not attempt to limit the use of the Chinese troops on the mainland.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The misquotation on my part—

General MACARTHUR. What we have recommended there, as I said this morning, I appointed a commission that went down there with the approval of Washington, who made a full report after 2 months

of study of what matériel was necessary to place the troops, the Nationalist troops on Formosa, in a condition of general preparedness for fighting.

That report has been in general approved, and as I understand, is being carried out now.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the General. I have no more questions now. I would like to reserve the right to perhaps ask questions at a future time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green.

Senator GREEN. General, in the first place I would like to join with Senator Smith in thanking you for your kind hospitality in Tokyo in 1949.

General MACARTHUR. We still remember that visit with great pleasure out there, Senator.

Senator GREEN. What I would like to ask is a question which seems to me to go to the basis of the whole difference that has been developed. It is this:

VICTORY WITHOUT SUPPORT OF UN ALLIES

The theory that we could win a quick victory in China simply by lending logistic support to the Chinese troops now in Formosa and in bombarding the coast cities and in establishing blockade would, in the first place, would it not, indicate we would proceed alone and not with any help from the other United Nations?

General MACARTHUR. I can give you no testimony about the United Nations, Senator.

Senator GREEN. What would be your expectation?

General MACARTHUR. My hope would be of course that the United Nations would see the wisdom and utility of that course, but if they did not, I still believe that the interest of the United States being the predominant one in Korea, would require our action.

Senator GREEN. Alone?

General MACARTHUR. Alone, if necessary. If the other nations of the world haven't got enough sense to see where appeasement leads after the appeasement which led to the Second World War in Europe, if they can't see exactly the road that they are following in Asia, why then we had better protect ourselves and go it alone.

Senator GREEN. Then why do you think that the Chinese now in Formosa, even with that help and without our ground forces in China, could achieve a victory when Chian Kai-shek suffered such a severe defeat previously?

CHINESE COMMUNIST STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe that the Chinese Nationalist forces alone, Senator, could achieve any such victory, but using them in conjunction with our own forces in accordance with the recommendations the Joint Chiefs of Staff made January 12, I believe that we would achieve a victory within a reasonable period of time.

I believe that the Chinese, the potential of China to wage modern war, is limited. She lacks the industrial base upon which modern war is based.

She is unable herself to turn out an air force or to turn out a navy. She is unable to supply herself with some of the heavier munitions.

I believe that the minute the pressure was placed upon her distributive system, the minute you stop the flow of strategic materials, which has been going on so extensively since the Korean War started, that she would be unable to maintain in the field even the armies that she has now.

What I mean to say is if she has now an army of four or five million men, after the blockade, after the breaking up of her distributive systems due to her enormous poverty, due to the fact that she is only a couple of jumps ahead of starvation at any time at all, that that pressure of blockade and of concentrated attack upon her supply lines would make it impossible for her to maintain anything like four million men in the field. Perhaps a million men, perhaps half that. She, I believe, has the inherent weaknesses for modern war of relying entirely upon ground forces and not having the industrial system to even supply them.

I believe that against the modern scientific methods of the United Nations, the potential of the United Nations, of the United States, if you would have it so, is sufficient to force the Chinese to stop their aggression in Korea.

We have no desire to destroy China, quite the contrary. You know from your own erudite and long experience of the innate friendship between the two countries. But we do have a great desire to make her stop her aggressive attacking in Korea.

I believe when you hit her base potential that way she would be forced to stop her aggression in Korea. I believe under those conditions she would talk a reasonable cease-fire procedure.

WHAT WOULD BE NEEDED FOR VICTORY OVER CHINA?

Senator GREEN. You do not think then that she would further call upon America for ground forces as well as air and sea forces?

General MACARTHUR. I don't know whether anybody would call on the United States for ground forces, but I do know it would be utterly reckless and foolish for the United States to even consider it. I do not believe it would be necessary.

Senator GREEN. The last experience they had in China when the Japanese attacked with air, sea, and land forces, was that China successfully resisted, although not so well equipped then as the Nationalist troops would be now.

General MACARTHUR. The objective of Japan and our objective, Senator, is different as day and night. The objective of Japan was to conquer, occupy, control and exploit all of China. Our only objective is to force the Chinese to stop their attacks in Korea on our troops. The two things are entirely different.

Senator GREEN. Well, are not masses of China now, the population of China, as much opposed to Chiang Kai-shek's forces as they were then to the Japanese invasion?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you, Senator.

Senator GREEN. If that were true, then why would not the result be the same?

General MACARTHUR. The general reports from China, of course, are growing restlessness under the slavery of totalitarian rule. Just

how far that may have gone, I don't know. The Chinese on Formosa will tell you it has gone a long way. The reports that come in indicate that. But without the intimate knowledge that would come from personal presence, I wouldn't attempt to act as a seer and answer such basic questions as that.

I do say unhesitatingly that with the power that we could bring against her with our air and Navy, with the assistance of the ground forces that the Nationalists might summon, that I believe we can force her to stop her aggression in Korea, which is the only objective as far as I see it, that we would have in such a conflict.

REDUCING AMERICAN LOSSES IN KOREA

Now you speak of American forces being sucked into China, ground forces. I invite your attention to the fact that hundreds of thousands of American Ground Forces have already been committed in Korea, and if you keep on this indecisive fighting, hundreds of thousands of more of them will go there.

Our losses already, the battle casualties, are approaching 65,000. This conflict in Korea has already lasted almost as long as General Eisenhower's decisive campaign which brought the European War to an end. And yet the only program that I have been able to hear is that we shall indecisively go on resisting aggression, whatever that may mean. And if you do, you are going to have thousands and thousands and thousands of American lives that will fall, and in my own opinion events finally will catch up with you, so that you will have to stop it in some way; and then the great question is—Where does the responsibility of that blood rest?

This I am quite sure—It is not going to rest on my shoulders.

Senator GREEN. As I understand it, the pressure that could be brought in the south, you count upon to reduce the pressure in Korea to such an extent that it would be a quick victory in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. What I said, Senator, was that if you use the Chinese forces on Formosa for a diversionary effect, and force the enemy to operate on another front, you will unquestionably diminish the pressure upon our forces in Korea, and thereby you will save American blood and American efforts.

EFFECT OF MILITARY VICTORY IN KOREA ON POLITICAL VICTORY IN CHINA

Senator GREEN. I understand how it might save that in Korea, but would it not increase it in China by more than what you save in Korea? If you get or you could get thereby a quick victory in Korea, it does not assure, or does it assure, you of a quick victory in China? Have we not substituted a greater problem for a lesser one? That is the thing that bothers me, and that is the reason I am asking these questions.

General MACARTHUR. I believe that if you will hit the Chinese and stop their potentials for war, you will bring peace not only to Korea but you will bring peace to China—that is as far as you can bring it.

Senator GREEN. Well, there is one other—
General MACARTHUR. The great problem, as I see it, in Korea, the great problem is to stop this sacrifice of American blood that has not got any definite end to it, as I see it.

Senator GREEN. There is one other phase to the question which applies to both Korea and China, which you touched upon, and that is this: You have dealt with these questions in both countries on a purely military basis. But isn't our Government required to give consideration and decide upon it on both a military and a political basis? Can you separate them so distinctly and say that a military victory is a political victory?

General MACARTHUR. I think that it is quite impossible to draw a line of differentiation and say this is a political and this is a military situation.

The American Government should have such coordination so that the political and military are in coordination.

WAR AS THE ULTIMATE PROCESS OF POLITICS

The general definition which for many decades has been accepted was that war was the ultimate process of politics; that when all other political means failed, you then go to force; and when you do that, the balance of control, the balance of concept, the main interest involved, the minute you reach the killing stage, is the control of the military. A theater commander, in any campaign, is not merely limited to the handling of his troops; he commands that whole area politically, economically, and militarily. You have got to trust at that stage of the game when politics fails, and the military takes over, you must trust the military, or otherwise you will have the system that the Soviet once employed of the political commissar, who would run the military as well as the politics of the country.

Now, the differentiation that exists between the political features and the military features, I am not able to discuss because I have not been here in Washington. Others will be able to tell you more about that than I, but I do unquestionably state that when men become locked in battle, that there should be no artifice under the name of politics, which should handicap your own men, decrease their chances for winning, and increase their losses.

RELATIONSHIP OF CAMPAIGN IN KOREA TO COMMUNISM IN CHINA

Senator GREEN. Well, but the point is a little different from that. A military victory, a quick military victory, does not necessarily mean anything but the defeat and disintegration of the armies, but it does not affect the population. If you would defeat the Communist armies, it does not necessarily mean that you can defeat communism in China. General MACARTHUR. Senator, as far as the United Nations in Korea is concerned, it is limited to Korea. They are trying to clear Korea. I don't understand that in any decisions or discussions that have arisen we are trying to do more than stop the Chinese from aggression in Korea. I believe when we do that that we have to put sufficient military forces upon them to do it.

I do not believe we can put that sufficient military force upon them if we limit ourselves to the inhibitions we do now, just in the area of Korea. I believe the minute that we put those pressures on them that the Red Chinese, if they have any sensibilities of discretion at all, would enter into a cease-fire parley.

When we get them to stop their aggression in Korea, I think we have accomplished everything that the United Nations resolution and that the United States desires, as far as I know.

Now, the questions that you have raised are questions that deal with other matters than that. They deal with the future of China.

I have not discussed that or addressed myself to it in any way. I won't attempt to. What I am dealing with is the situation in Korea in all my comments and statements.

Senator GREEN. Suppose the United Nations should withdraw these inhibitions under which you have been acting in Korea. Then, would that change your point of view as to the policy?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that they should withdraw their inhibitions; they should apply the economic, military sanctions that are necessary, and that we would force the Chinese to stop their aggression in Korea. I do; and that is the very essence and point that I have tried to make here.

Senator GREEN. But also you stated in that connection, did you not, that you had received no instructions from the United Nations since your original appointment?

General MACARTHUR. The general objectives of the United Nations, as evidenced by their resolutions, have not varied or changed. My instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as the agency for the United Nations, have modified the military conditions under which I operate.

As I said this morning, they have made the paramount purpose and mission the security of our forces, and the security of Japan, and in handling the forces, those were the two basic concepts upon which I was operating.

Senator GREEN. Well, in your opinion, would the action of the Chinese in joining in this aggression justify the United Nations, acting through the Chiefs of Staff in modifying those inhibitions?

General MACARTHUR. I certainly do.

Senator GREEN. Well, why would not that be a feasible method of bringing about this quick victory?

General MACARTHUR. I don't quite understand what you mean.

Senator GREEN. Well, is not that another method—

General MACARTHUR. As I understand your questioning, the entrance of Red China in the war against us warranted the United Nations in changing their basic directives. I have asked for that frequently.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator GREEN. There is just one other question, which is not related—not directly—in this discussion, precipitated by an exchange of letters between Representative Martin and yourself which, I think, has been made public, was that the whole of the correspondence?

General MACARTHUR. What was that?

Senator GREEN. Was that the whole of your correspondence on that subject?

General MACARTHUR. It was.

Senator GREEN. There were two letters?

General MACARTHUR. I have always felt, Senator, that any Member of Congress, is entitled, within security provisions, to any information that he asked for.

When Representative Martin wrote and asked my opinion, I immediately replied. It made so little impression upon me, I will say, that later on when somebody said a great deal of commotion had been raised by that letter, I had to consult my files to see what the letter was.

I repeat, when any Senator or Congressman of the Government of the United States asks my opinion on a public question that is not security-classified, I shall give him freely and frankly my opinion. That is what I visualize is the proper courtesy and respect that is due to the legislative leaders of the country.

Senator GREEN. Well, then, you had other similar correspondence with other Representatives—

General MACARTHUR. I don't recall, sir.

Senator GREEN (continuing). And Senators? I did not hear you, General MACARTHUR. The Congress itself; I made a report to it several years ago.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. There have been many Congressmen and Senators through Japan, and always have I answered to the best of my ability the questions and queries they propounded. You were one of them, Senator.

Senator GREEN. Well, thank you very much. [Laughter.] With that exchange of courtesies, I conclude my questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. General MacArthur, I believe you said this morning that you—you read a letter you had in your statement this morning, the date of which was January 12, and you said that was a statement that supported the position which you took in your meeting where—

Senator FULBRIGHT. Will you speak up a little bit?

Senator JOHNSON. I beg the Senator's pardon.

AGREEMENT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH MACARTHUR

RECOMMENDATIONS

This morning you said or you read from a document to support the position you took at the joint meeting of the Congress to the effect that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with your position. Were there any conditions attached to that statement other than the one you pointed out?

General MACARTHUR. On those points none except those that I pointed out, as far as I recall.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you have any other information from the Joint Chiefs collectively or the Chiefs individually that would indicate that they support the position you took?

General MACARTHUR. I know nothing except the January 12 statement. That is the last—

Senator JOHNSON. In your conversations with General Collins from time to time he may have expressed himself on the wisdom of the course you outlined. Did he?

General MACARTHUR. General Collins visited the command after that. At that time the great question that he raised was whether we could stay in Korea at all or whether we would evacuate. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff were not sure we could stick in Korea. It was my opinion that we could.

That was the great question at that time, whether we should evacuate Korea or whether we should not.

Senator JOHNSON. Was it your impression that the recommendations that the Joint Chiefs made in the January 12 letter to the Secretary of Defense was based on the possibility of our evacuating Korea or merely stabilizing it over there?

General MACARTHUR. The statement itself referred to that possibility. I know no more than what was in that study. I wouldn't attempt to interpret what was more than placed in that paper.

I wouldn't attempt to say what the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be today, but I do say that was what they recommended on January 12.

Senator JOHNSON. And there were no conditions attached to those recommendations other than the ones you read?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing that I can recall, and that their opinion that was made in that coincided almost identically with my own beliefs in the matter.

And I may say that every responsible military authority that I have talked with, not only in my own command but in the foreign commanders who are there, have agreed with that. I don't know a single exception.

Senator JOHNSON. Has there been any other indication other than the document of January the 12th to the effect that the Joint Chiefs support the program you advocate?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing in writing that I know of.

Senator JOHNSON. Anything orally?

General MACARTHUR. Nothing that I know of. Senator JOHNSON. General, you said this morning that you constantly asked for more than you were able to obtain.

General MACARTHUR. I want to say, Senator, if I can interrupt you rather rudely, that they have never taken any position as far as I know which is in contradiction to the position of January 12. If they have, it was never furnished me.

DEMAND FOR REINFORCEMENTS

Senator JOHNSON. I believe this morning you said that you had asked for more than you were able to obtain.

General MACARTHUR. That's right.

Senator JOHNSON. I recall quite well that was your position the last time I saw you back in 1942. Would you care to elaborate on that statement by indicating some of the requests you made and the size of the force that you felt you needed and the size of the force you got?

General MACARTHUR. I don't recall all the details, Senator, but the first recommendation I made after I put in the army in Japan was that I should get an entire new army of at least four divisions with all its complements.

The state of preparedness of the country and other obligations seemed to make that impossible, and definite limitations on the number of ground troops were made.

Senator JOHNSON. You would say it would be inaccurate, however, to state that you had been given all the men you requested?

General MACARTHUR. Inaccurate. I have never been given all the men that I requested. The organizations that I have have never been brought up to full war strength.

When I left 3 weeks ago, they were still several thousands short of riflemen in the various combat divisions.

INCREASE NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION IN KOREA

Senator JOHNSON. General, could you give the committee some indication of the increase in forces that will be required in your judgment to carry out the program that you think this Nation should carry out in Korea, the Far East?

General MACARTHUR. I believe that the start of that program should be the lifting of the inhibitions against our present Navy and Air Force.

Senator JOHNSON. That would not materially increase the requirements for men for those two services?

General MACARTHUR. Of the ground forces—I do not believe that the settlement of the Korean conflict would require any great increase in our ground forces. There is a definite limitation logistically as to what we can supply in the way of ground forces.

Our great strength would be to attack basically the Chinese forces from our strength. You are a bridge player. You know that the first rule in bridge is to lead from your strength.

Our strength is the air and the Navy, as compared to the Chinese. That is where we should apply the pressure. They cannot, they have nothing to resist it with. They are wide open. And by using those scientific methods which are at our disposal you will obviate the necessity of putting in ground troops and losing them by the thousands as we are doing now.

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Senator JOHNSON. General, in the light of this program that you have recommended, would you favor increasing the limitation on the ceiling now on our Armed Forces, the ceiling of 3,462,000 men?

General MACARTHUR. Oh, Senator, you are far afield from me. I have had no part in the policy discussions or the studies of the over-all strength of the United States. I have been a theater commander, confined myself entirely to that.

I wouldn't know. I would have to go into the matter and make studies, which I have never attempted.

Senator JOHNSON. As I remember, in your very fine statement to the joint meeting of the House and Senate you stated that there were some who had expressed the thought that our strength was inadequate to protect us on both fronts and that, as I remember it, you felt that was an expression of defeatism.

I assume you were talking about our potential strength and not our present strength.

General MACARTHUR. When was this statement made?

Senator JOHNSON. In your speech to the House and the Senate. General MACARTHUR. Oh, yes. Yes, it does.

Senator JOHNSON. General, in the light of world conditions and the demands that are made upon this Nation for trained manpower, do you favor universal military training?

General MACARTHUR. I have never given the subject the slightest thought, Senator. I am a believer in preparedness. If the best way to get preparedness would be the universal military force, I would certainly be for it. Whether that is the best way, after we look it all over, the experts seem to think that it is so. I have never given the matter any study in the last 14 years.

ADDITIONAL FORCES NEEDED TO CARRY OUT MACARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. So far as you are informed, however, you do not believe that the execution of the program you recommend would materially increase the need for additional manpower?

General MACARTHUR. I wouldn't know, Senator, until I made a study of it. The over-all strength that is necessary to be kept as a standing force is flexible, of course, and depends upon the relative preparedness of the various nations of the world.

Senator JOHNSON. But you recommend a specific program in the Far East. Now, will that program, in your judgment, require additional manpower and, if so, what is your estimate of how much would be required?

General MACARTHUR. It does not require a great ground force in the Far East.

It does require a certain amount of Navy and Air. It does require garrisons, such as we would have in the various places—Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa. It would be a small fraction, indeed, of the total forces of the United States.

I think the forces that we have out there now, including the Korean forces, represent something less than 10 percent of our potential.

I am sure that that would not have to be raised to any material strength to accomplish the purpose of defense that I spoke of.

AGREEMENT WITH MACARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. Did I understand you to say that the foreign commanders in Korea shared your views about the kind of program that should be put into effect there?

General MACARTHUR. Every officer that I have talked with there is in general agreement.

Senator JOHNSON. And by that statement, of course, you include General Ridgway?

General MACARTHUR. General who?

Senator JOHNSON. Ridgway.

General MACARTHUR. I would, of course, prefer to let General Ridgway speak for himself; but I will say "Yes."

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MACARTHUR. I think you will find, if you will go into the reports that he made, that is quite in agreement.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BRITISH VIEWS ON MACARTHUR PROGRAM

General MACARTHUR. I would like to get into a little different phase of the matter there, in the Orient, in Korea and China, than has been discussed heretofore.

I would like to ask you about the British attitude.

General MACARTHUR. About what?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. About the British attitude, not only in Korea, but in connection with any activities by the Chinese Nationalists on the mainland of China; and to try to tell you what is in my mind, by way of this question, I will just say:

Have the British been vigorous in resisting the idea of bombing, strategically, in Manchuria, or of taking the wraps off of Chiang Kai-shek for the purpose of letting him use his troops in the best method possible against the Reds?

General MACARTHUR. I know nothing directly; but from what has been carried in the press, and other accounts, I should say they resisted it about as strongly as was possible.

That is the general impression that we have, over in the Far East. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you believe that Hong Kong, the British foothold there, has anything to do with that? In other words, is it believed, over there, that if they support any such action by Chiang Kai-shek, or support strategic bombing in Manchuria, they will lose Hong Kong to the Reds?

General MACARTHUR. I could not tell you, Senator, except by speculative comment.

I have had no direct dealings with the British, except the small token forces that operated under my command.

You know much more about that than I do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask your opinion on another matter, then? That is, if you care to express it, or if you have an opinion on it. Assuming that the Chinese Reds would be able to consolidate China, that is, win a complete victory—

General MACARTHUR. That is, continental China?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Continental China.

General MACARTHUR. Yes?

VALUE OF HONG KONG

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And assuming that some sort of a cease-fire or appeasement or something of that kind, that would give them the ultimate political victory they want, which is the consolidation of Red China, occurred—do you believe that the Red Chinese would permit the British to stay in Hong Kong very long after that consolidation? General MACARTHUR (laughing). If you ask my personal opinion, no.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sir?

General MACARTHUR. My own personal opinion would be "No."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They would not permit them to stay there very long?

General MACARTHUR. That would be my belief. I think that the port of Hong Kong is now a means by which great quantities of materials, strategic and otherwise, pour through into Red China.

If Red China took that away from the British, it would react against them. I think it is beneficial for the Chinese under present conditions to allow that port to remain in the hands of the British, and to receive the constant flow of strategic materials that goes through there.

I happened to see one of the last papers before I relinquished my command in the Far East, a report from the American consul general, as to the strategic materials which had gone through Hong Kong and reached the Red Chinese. All these materials were on our proscribed strategic list. And, as I recall the figure, it was for 3 weeks; it was for the 2 weeks in February and a week in March, wasn't it? About 3 weeks at that time, and it consisted of these strategic materials alone—of \$210 million, Hong Kong dollars, worth of goods, as I recall. These figures are not accurate but they are approximately so. I think the Hong Kong dollar is now probably about 5 to 1. So that would be about \$40 million worth of strategic materials—railroads, steel products, ties, petroleum, various matters of talk about what might be cleared from Singapore up to Tientsin or Tsingtao or those places. This was through the port of Hong Kong alone.

I correct myself, that the total that passed through there of strategic materials which were proscribed and those which were not proscribed was \$40 million.

That report—have you got that report here?

General WHITNEY. I have. That is the report of the General MACARTHUR. We have it here. That is the report of the American consul made under—what date?

General WHITNEY. March 29, 1951.

General MACARTHUR. March of this year. That shows the great value to the Chinese of having that gateway of supply.

Now, if you place an economic blockade, of course, that would close it down, and the advantages to the Chinese of having it in British hands, and therefore open, would tend to disappear. And following the logic of your statement, it would increase the dangers and jeopardies of Hong Kong passing into Chinese hands.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S OBJECTIVES IN FORMOSA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the event the Chinese Reds are able to consolidate their control over the mainland of China and be victorious in that effort, would they rest until they had taken over Formosa also? In other words, is there any chance in your view of any settlement with the Chinese Reds without Formosa being given to them?

General MACARTHUR. My views on Formosa are pretty well known. I believe if you lose Formosa, you lose the key to our littoral line of defense and encompass Truk. I believe the Philippines and Japan both would be untenable from our military point of view. Formosa cannot be taken by Red China as long as the United States maintains control of the seas and of the air. There isn't the capacity, in my opinion, of Red China to storm the gates of Formosa.

Now, whether the Chinese would make any settlement which didn't involve the future of Formosa is entirely speculative. But the concept I have as far as Korea is concerned, is to put such pressure of force upon them that they would have to stop the aggression in Korea. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Well, I have gained the impression one way or another that Formosa is the very key commodity in any

dealings with the Red Chinese; that is, that they avidly want Formosa, and that is one of their great objectives, along with the consolidation of the mainland of China; that the Red Chinese want Formosa and they will not give up their efforts to get it.

IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

General MACARTHUR. I believe that from our standpoint we practically lose the Pacific Ocean if we give up or lose Formosa. I don't want you to misunderstand me. We haven't the faintest aggressive intent against Formosa. We do not need Formosa for our bases or anything else. But Formosa should not be allowed to fall into Red hands.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. That would make our position in the Pacific, at least in the Far East, untenable eventually?

General MACARTHUR. If it fell into enemy hands, it would make our position untenable in my opinion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General, this is a speculative question, but it is one that is in the minds of a great many people. If a settlement should be made of the situation over there, if it should be resolved so that Red China consolidated her position and became the recognized government there, do you think that we could look thereafter to increased dangers and threats in the region of Alaska from Communist forces of whatever combination they might be—Russia or Red China, or a combination of both? Do you think that would increase our danger there?

General MACARTHUR. If the enemy secured Formosa and secured thereby the Pacific Ocean, that would immeasurably increase the dangers of that ocean being used as an avenue of advance by any potential enemy. And Alaska is on that ocean; it would unquestionably increase the dangers to Alaska as well as it would be to the State of California, the State of Washington, and Oregon, Central and South America.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any information that you could give us as to the strength of the Russian forces—air forces or other forces—across the Bering Strait and the vicinity of that strength?

General MACARTHUR. Alaska? That is not my theater, Senator. I couldn't tell you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, as you are well aware, there have been certain statements and claims made by people publicly that you were recalled because of what they termed insubordination. You perhaps have seen statements in the press made by certain people to that effect.

I would like to ask you whether or not at any time you received any communication from any official superior either suggesting that you might be guilty of insubordination or suggesting that any course of action of yours might be considered insubordination.

In other words, did anybody warn you that you might be guilty of insubordination?

General MACARTHUR. I hadn't the faintest idea of it. I am not conscious of having trod even close to any such thing.

WIDE DISCRETION OF THEATER COMMANDERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, is it not historically true throughout military history that commanding officers, as their rank increases, including their command and their responsibility in the theater increases, that by the same token the breadth of their discretion is also recognized?

In other words, a theater commander is more than purely a disciplined officer taking and carrying out meticulously strict orders within certain narrow limitations. A theater commander, and especially a commander in charge of a great area of operation such as the European invasion under General Eisenhower, and your own activities in the South Pacific and then in the Far East, those commands and those positions carry with it the necessity for broader policy activities and policy statements on the part of a commanding officer than the commander of a garrison, for instance, in some restricted locality would have.

Hasn't that been historically true about commanders?

General MACARTHUR. Completely.

POWERS AS SCAP IN JAPAN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General, you were the Governor of Japan; were you not?

General MACARTHUR. I was—

Senator HICKENLOOPER (interposing). And a political and administrative officer there?

General MACARTHUR. I was more than the Governor of Japan. I was the sole executive authority for administration and execution in Japan.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And as such you were charged and authorized in a broad way to make policy decisions; were you not?

General MACARTHUR. I was. I had not only the normal executive authorities such as our own President has in this country, but I had legislative authority.

I could by fiat issue directives. That I did not was a matter of judgment, not of authority.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And therefore the authority that you had carried with it the broadest discretion; did it not?

General MACARTHUR. There is no question, a discretion which I have exercised frequently. The various proclamations, the various statements, the various manifestoes which I issued to the Japanese people were under the authority delegated to me. They were not subject to the controls of any higher authority.

I was required to carry out and implement the policies of the Far Eastern Commission, but in the gaps that existed where those policies did not apply, my own authority was complete.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that you operated not only as a military commander in military operations, but you operated in a political capacity?

General MACARTHUR. I did.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With the broadest powers and discretions both in the military field within the limits of your command and in the political field within the broad directives of your assignment?

General MACARTHUR. With reference to Japan, completely.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Now, didn't you issue directives and orders of a political nature in Japan from time to time without having first had them okayed in every instance by Washington?

General MACARTHUR. I issued them on my own authority.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Were you ever charged with insubordination or noncooperation because you issued—

General MACARTHUR. Never. That was my duty and responsibility. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Those things from time to time?

EFFECT OF AMERICAN PRESTIGE IN THE FAR EAST OF FAILURE TO WIN VICTORY IN KOREA

This is another question that goes to the matter of opinion, General. The longer this situation in Korea remains indecisive, would you give us your opinion on the effect of the confidence and the trust which other nations in the Orient may have in the United States.

In other words, are they getting shaky toward us the longer the indecisiveness in Korea occurs, or—

General MACARTHUR. If the United States doesn't bring the Korean War to a decisive and victorious end, she will have to accept all of the consequences of a disastrous defeat.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, this is going back just a little way, but you were the commander in the Far East and I believe the Supreme Commander in the Pacific in the closing days of the last war, at least against the Japanese; were you not?

General MACARTHUR. I was Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific area.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which included Japan, did it not, and it included action against Japan?

General MACARTHUR. Japan was included in my command when I became the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

DROPPING OF THE ATOM BOMB ON JAPAN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the question I want to ask you is this: How long before the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima were you told it was going to be dropped?

General MACARTHUR. As far as I recall, it was a short time. As far as I recall, General Spaatz came out there and informed me that the bomb was to be dropped. I should say that was 10 days or 2 weeks before the bomb was actually dropped.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many?

General MACARTHUR. Ten days or two weeks would be my guess now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, I have some questions that have been submitted to me by some other members of the Senate who are not members of this committee, and under the rule I shall adopt these questions as my own, although they are questions which I have been requested to ask.

CHANGES OF VICTORY OVER CHINA

The first one is: You have been quoted as saying China is without the essentials of modern industrial warfare—oil, rubber, food—and

we need only "smash their tenuous railway system to reduce them quickly to impotence."

What are the possibilities of reconquering part or all of the Chinese mainland if the UN troops are properly supported and the Chinese forces of Chiang freed to attack the Communists?

I personally feel that you answered most of that question a while ago. General MACARTHUR. That has run through the discussion entirely.

I think my testimony would answer it. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I feel that you did answer it. I am going through these because I feel obligated to ask the questions of any member.

Well, the answer is that the possibilities are good that the Chinese forces could be defeated. Senator, what I have said is if you put that General MACARTHUR. Senator, what I have said is if you put that pressure on China she will be forced to stop her aggression in Korea.

EFFECT OF PRESIDENT'S ORDER ON FORMOSA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. The second question is: What is the military effect of the President's order to the Navy to guard Red China against sea or air attack by the forces of free China?

General MACARTHUR. What do you mean? His order about Formosa?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I take it that the questioner means the use of our Navy to prevent Nationalist Chinese from going on the mainland and to prevent Red China from going to Formosa. That is, the blockade order to our Navy.

General MACARTHUR. The result is to lose the potential against the common enemy of the forces on Formosa, the Chinese forces on Formosa.

TROOPS' OPINION ON BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Question No. three: What is the state of the morale of our ground and Navy forces when the American Navy guards the Red China coast while we are forbidden to bomb their troop concentrations?

General MACARTHUR. That is a question and an argument rolled into one, isn't it? The morale of our forces over in Korea when I left them was tops. They were splendid in every way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, just supplementing this question, may I ask whether or not they are happy about not being able to bomb the arsenal back in Manchuria?

General MACARTHUR. I think the vote would be 100 to nothing in favor of bombing.

STRENGTH OF CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Question No. 4: I understand that American-trained Chinese form the core of the free Chinese Navy, that 4,360 men trained in this country form the core of the free Chinese Air Force, and that the Chinese armies now on Formosa are being trained by General Sun Li-jen, a graduate of VMI.

Would these forces of free China be able to inflict military damage on the Communist armies in South China?

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably. General Sun I know very well. He is a VMI graduate. I think he is a graduate also of our school at Fort Leavenworth. He is an able commander.

Properly equipped, as I explained this morning, with several months' training in the new equipment that we might supply them, the Chinese on Formosa would be a formidable force.

The general efficacy as against the Chinese Communists would depend somewhat upon the skill with which they were handled, the support they received, and many other things. It is impossible to answer the question categorically.

STRATEGY AGAINST JAPAN IN WORLD WAR II

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Question No. 5: Isn't your proposal for sea and air blockade of Red China the same strategy by which Americans achieved victory over the Japanese in the Pacific?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. In the Pacific we by-passed them. We closed in. You must understand that Japan had an enormous population of nearly 80 million people, crowded into 4 islands. It was about half a farm population. The other half was engaged in industry.

Potentially the labor pool in Japan, both in quantity and quality, is as good as anything that I have ever known. Some place down the line they have discovered what you might call the dignity of labor, that men are happier when they are working and constructing than when they are idling.

This enormous capacity for work meant that they had to have something to work on. They built the factories, they had the labor, but they didn't have the basic materials.

There is practically nothing indigenous to Japan except the silk worm. They lack cotton, they lack wool, they lack petroleum products, they lack tin, they lack rubber, they lack a great many other things, all of which was in the Asiatic basin.

They feared that if those supplies were cut off, there would be 10 to 12 million people unoccupied in Japan. Their purpose, therefore, in going to war was largely dictated by security.

The raw materials—those countries which furnished raw materials for their manufacture—such countries as Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, and so on—they, with the advantage of preparedness and surprise, seized all those bases, and their general strategic concept was to hold those outlying bastions, the islands of the Pacific, so that we would bleed ourselves white in trying to reconquer them, and that the losses would be so tremendous that we would ultimately acquiesce in a treaty which would allow them to control the basic products of the places they had captured.

In meeting that, we evolved an entirely new strategy. They held certain bastion points, and what we did was to evade those points, and go around them.

We came in behind them, and we crept up and crept up, and crept up, always approaching the lanes of communication which led from those countries, conquered countries, to Japan.

By the time we had seized the Philippines, and Okinawa, we were enabled to lay down a sea and Navy blockade so that the supplies for

the maintenance of the Japanese armed forces ceased to reach Japan. The minute we applied that blockade, the defeat of Japan was a certainty.

The ultimate result was that when Japan surrendered, they had at least 3,000,000 of as fine ground troops as I have ever known, that laid down their arms because they didn't have the materials to fight with, and they didn't have the potential to gather them at the points of importance where we would attack. We hit them where they weren't; and, as a result, that magnificent army of theirs, very wisely surrendered.

The ground forces that were available in the Pacific were probably at no time more than one-third of the ground forces that Japan had available; but, as I say, when we blockaded that way, when we disrupted their entire economic system, they could not supply the sinews to their troops that were necessary to keep them in active combat and, therefore, they surrendered.

SIMILARITY OF JAPANESE SITUATION IN WORLD WAR II TO CHINESE SITUATION TODAY

Now, the problem with China is quite similar; only China has not got anything like the resource the Japanese Empire had.

It would be easier to blockade them. A blockade along their coasts would be a very simple problem if all the nations of the United Nations joined in.

The only other way in which China can get logistical support is from the Soviet. As I explained this morning, that railroad that runs from the great industrial centers of Russia, which are in European Russia, is already strained to the utmost to maintain the garrisons they have there now; to place them in a position—the increase of traffic that would be necessary to place them as a predatory expeditionary army would be too great.

There is a very definite limit to what they can give to Communist China. That, in my opinion, is why Communist China does not turn up with an adequate air force and an adequate navy. She can't build it herself, and the Soviet can't get it out to her.

It is for that reason that, in my own professional opinion, Communist China, its power to wage modern war, has been tremendously exaggerated; and I believe when we place the pressure, the blockade pressure, and the disruptive pressure of the air, on its distributive systems, that she would be forced to yield within a reasonable period of time.

You must understand that in China itself, they have the greatest difficulty in merely supplying their present civil population. I don't suppose there is a year in China that from 5 to 10 million people don't die either of starvation or of the results of malnutrition. It is an economy of poverty, and the minute you disrupt it, you will turn great segments of its population into disorder and discontent, and the internal strains would help to blow up her potential for war.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have a few more questions here. As I say, these questions I am reading to you are questions I have been requested to ask.

EFFECT OF UN ON WAR IN KOREA

Question No. 6: The legal authority by which President Truman acts in Korea seems to give him total power to act in the name of the UN, above the law-making powers of Congress.

Would it delay victory in Korea if Congress were to insist that the President act as President of the United States only, and not as agent of any other power, national or international; and if, instead of working through the network of UN, we prosecuted the war on a national basis only, with our actual fighting allies?

General MACARTHUR. I will have to pass that one up, Senator. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Question No. 7:

TRAINING THE SOUTH KOREAN RESERVES

Would it relieve the pressure on American troops in Korea if we began at once to feed, clothe, and arm some of the South Korean reserves with some of the supplies we are sending to Europe?

General MACARTHUR. There is a large potential of manpower in South Korea; but to train it, and to supply it is a matter of gravest difficulty.

The men are there, but because the men are there does not mean that they are soldiers. It takes months to train those men.

What the relativity of supply would be, I do not know; but it would take some time to do more than we are doing now, in the enlistment of the South Koreans.

One of the last orders I gave was to increase, by 25 percent, the normal strength of the Korean divisions.

We have now under arms, 10 Korean divisions.

We have, in addition, their police and constabulary forces; but the Korean division—I gave the order to General Ridgway, permitting him to increase by 25 percent, the combat strength, the rifleman strength of each of those divisions.

That had not been accomplished when I left. There were large gaps still there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, it is—

General MACARTHUR. I think it is the desire of everyone to utilize, as far as possible, the native population.

FAILURE TO USE ALL OUR WEAPONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then I understand your position to be, General, so far as the Korean campaign is concerned, and our objectives to clear Korea of the Reds that we are simply not using the strength and the weapons which we have, to produce that victory; in other words, our weapons are not potential, they are actual weapons; a strategic air, and navy; and Allied Nationalist troops, for instance, on Formosa, which, from a military standpoint, would contribute to, in your opinion, a speedy termination of this thing, with victory against aggression in Korea?

General MACARTHUR. It would be the very best chance we would have to bring it to a speedy end, a successful end. You have stated my position almost exactly correctly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now is it your opinion that the inhibitions against the use of those weapons which we have has been a military decision or a political decision?

General MACARTHUR. If you mean that it's been my decision in any way, it has not. Who issued, what influence issued the directives I couldn't tell you, whether it was the political decision made or whether it was a military decision or a combination, but the decisions are there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you know of any military commander in history who had at his disposal weapons which probably could be decisive in his favor in a war and failed to use them if he was authorized to use them?

General MACARTHUR. Never.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is the object of war, is it—and I think you said a moment ago, but I want to emphasize it again—to win victory and defeat the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least losses to our own armies?

General MACARTHUR. I don't see how any other conception could be made.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And your position is that we are fighting indecisively in Korea today, that is so far as the basic objective of cleaning Korea of aggression is concerned?

General MACARTHUR. Correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you say it would be something like, we are somewhat in the position of a football team that is allowed to advance the ball up somewhere near the opponent's goal line, but they can't call any plays that will go over the goal line and make a touchdown?

General MACARTHUR. Something like that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thank you, General. I may have at a later date some more questions to ask. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to say I have a rather lengthy list of questions, but I think it is only fair and courteous to my colleagues of the committee that I ask only a few of those questions at this time because I think every member of the committee ought to be allowed to ask some questions this first day of the hearing. I will ask a few questions now with the request that when all other members of the committee have asked whatever questions they care to, I might be permitted to ask further questions, subject of course to the right of those on the committee higher in seniority to ask their second round of questions first.

REQUEST FOR MAC ARTHUR'S REPORT TO THE UN

Before I ask any questions, Mr. Chairman, I wish to make a request of you to request of the Pentagon Building that we be provided with all records and documents showing any changes in General MacArthur's reports which either Defense or State Departments asked him to approve, with special identification of those particular documents which he was asked to approve but which he refused to approve and in regard to which he testified this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me respectfully suggest, Senator, that he follow the rule and place a written request. I am afraid I might not be

able to carry it out completely. If the Senator will dictate to me a note this afternoon when he returns to his office, I shall immediately transmit it along with my request that the documents be submitted.

Senator MORSE. I wanted to make that request in the presence of the general because I think it is only fair to him that he know that such a request is being made. I think he must subsequently be placed in the position where he can check the information that the Pentagon Building may give us in their response to testimony of the general this morning, concerning the messages that he refused to approve.

As to material that may be coming in this hearing, I do not think any of us are in a position to say at the present time, but I will make that written request of the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall follow what I have done heretofore and immediately transmit it to the Pentagon.

REQUEST FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS OF JANUARY 12, 1951

Senator MORSE. I shall also in writing, Mr. Chairman, ask you to obtain for the committee the full statement of the study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to by the general this morning; if the document the general read from is but an excerpt of the full study. I will make that request to check on the exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I might say that I requested at the outset, on the suggestion of Senator Bridges I believe, that the directive of January 12, 1951, be furnished to the committee.

I understand that it has been furnished in paraphrased form to the committee, but it was not furnished as a verbatim transcript.

The reason assigned by the Pentagon for the refusal to give the verbatim transcript was the fact that those messages involved the safety of our cryptographic code. It had been transmitted by code, and therefore in order that the committee and General MacArthur may have all the facts that I have, I might state at this juncture that General Bradley had called the committee and was very much concerned because this [deleted] report of this message was in the records of the committee.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Is my understanding correct, general, that you read from the paraphrase this morning and not from the original?

General MACARTHUR. These were notes that were made from an original study, Senator, which was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I fancy there are 50 or 60 copies of those sent out to various military people.

Senator MORSE. Is that not what we understand by a paraphrase?

General MACARTHUR. This was in a mimeographed or printed form, Senator MORSE. Is not that what we understand by a paraphrase of the original message? You did not read from the original message this morning but from a paraphrase?

[Deleted.]

General MACARTHUR. From the copy I received, yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. On my request, Mr. Chairman, I simply only ask to have furnished for the record what can be furnished within the security policies of the Pentagon.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall submit that request.

I might say further that if the Senator desires it, some of those documents are supposed to be for "eyes only." I do not know whether that particular one comes within that category. I think it can be arranged for the Senator to read but not make a verbatim copy of the document.

Senator Morse. I will ask to read it only in case it becomes material.

PROCEDURE FOR THE HEARING

Senator CAIN. For planning purposes, Mr. Chairman, what are your plans for recess? What hours, if any, have you selected for recess.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I had not selected any specific hour to recess. One witness becomes much more weary than 15 or 20 people interrogating him.

Senator CAIN. Indeed, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There cannot be any question about that, like one football team playing 10 or 12, they have a great many reserves.

General MACARTHUR. I would be very glad to stay indefinitely, Senator. I have commitments that I have made—I thought this would just be a 1-day session—that I am very anxious to carry out. So I would appreciate it if the committee could keep in session until they get through with me in a general way. As Senator Morse said, I would be available at some future date if you wished to clear up something of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, if that meets with the ideas of the committee and their commitments and responsibilities, why, we will proceed in that fashion.

Senator Morse. General, in your speech before the joint session, you said—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Morse has a very fine voice. I am sure if he put out a little more power we could hear him a little better. He is lowering it a little bit.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, before he starts, I did not understand the decision, whether you are going on or recess to some hour tonight and go over.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understood—I would like to have the general state again his suggestion that we continue here indefinitely, as I understood it.

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir; I would like to. I have commitments in New York tomorrow. I expect to fly back tonight, if it is possible to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. What dates next week would be convenient to you, General?

General MACARTHUR. Well, sir, I would try to meet the committee's wishes. I must say I have been away from here for 14 years, Senator; I am hard pressed, and I would solicit the consideration of the committee to expedite it as much as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe we can well understand that you are hard pressed. If you were to even contemplate accepting the invitations that the people in my own State have urged me to press upon you, that would take you for several weeks within itself. There cannot be any question about your being hard pressed. And I have understood that you have been out of the country, and for that reason, despite

some criticism, I, as you know, let you fix the date of your hearing, although I was constantly prodded here to bring the hearings about. I explained that you had been away for 14 years, and that you naturally were entitled to at least a respite from work here in this committee.

This whole question, though, is probably as much in the public eye at present as any issue of my time. The people are interested and these committees have responsibilities.

I wish to meet with your convenience just as much as we possibly can, and I am sure that is the purpose of the entire committee. If you feel that you cannot be here tomorrow, why, we will arrange for some other witness or postpone the hearings until next week. I shall try to get another witness.

General MACARTHUR. If you would let it proceed for a while, perhaps we could come to some natural conclusion, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, may I most respectfully make a suggestion on procedure. I do not think it possible to finish tonight. I do not think it is fair to either the general or to the members of this committee.

We have our other duties to perform, too, and I do not think it would be proper to go into a long night session and, therefore, I respectfully suggest—and I am not sure we should not vote upon it—that we proceed for a reasonable time, and then have a reasonable recess, and that the chairman be authorized to make arrangements with the general as to when he can be called back next week to finish his testimony. I think there are a great many documents needing study by this committee before we finish the examination of the general.

There are other witnesses who ought to be called before the committee to discuss even at this date some of the testimony that the general has already given today. I repeat to the chairman what I said earlier today. I think we would make a great mistake if we try to rush through the hearing without each man who, after all, represents his State, being free to ask such questions as he thinks appropriate. I think it would be a mistake to try to get through with this hearing-in-chief today.

I think we ought to proceed until around 5 o'clock, then recess, and then call the general back next week at a time convenient to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair undertakes to be the instrumentality of the committee. He does not know exactly what time is attempted to be played, but if the committee wishes to express itself on this matter, they should do so.

Senator Morse. I move you, Mr. Chairman, that we proceed until 5 o'clock, and then recess, and that the chairman be authorized to work out a calendar with the general for his reappearance before the committee sometime next week.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, speaking with respect to that, might we not follow the general's suggestion of carrying on here for a while? I think it would be helpful if each of the members, at least, had a chance to ask a few questions. I have cut mine down, and a number of questions I had intended to ask have already been asked of the general.

Perhaps, if we can fully agree to Senator Morse's suggestion, we can do so, and it may be necessary for the general to come back at a later time to be worked out by the chairman. But might we not proceed and see if we cannot make more headway than is now expected, rather than now set a fixed hour of adjournment, because I understand the general is willing to stay, as he has just stated, a little later if we can at least get around to the other committee members?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, does the Senator desire to vote on his motion now or does he desire to proceed, and see where we can go and what we can accomplish?

Senator Morse. I will be exceedingly cooperative. I will hold my motion for the time being, and renew it later tonight, but I am trying to be fair with the committee. I am not going to be rushed through my examination, and it is going to take me some time to complete my examination. I would like to ask a few questions.

Senator FURBERG. I would like to second that motion, with a little change; but I say it is, frankly, different to follow these things, after too long a time. I think we have had enough for today.

I would like to second the motion, although I would not object to it carrying on to 5:30.

Senator WITTEY. Make it 6 o'clock.

Senator Morse. I am perfectly willing to substitute the hour of 6 for the hour of 5.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, the Senator from Oregon has modified his motion. We will proceed to 5 o'clock—

Senator WITTEY. Six.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he modified his motion that we proceed until 5 o'clock to 6 o'clock, make the hour 6 o'clock, and that is the motion now before the committee.

Senator Morse. With the authorization of instructions to the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. With instructions to the Chair, that he will undertake to work out a convenient date with General MacArthur to resume these hearings.

Senator McMAHON. Next week.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the general said he could be here next week.

Those of you who favor that motion will say "Aye."

(There was a chorus of "Ayes.")

The CHAIRMAN. Those opposed?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. The "Ayes," gentlemen, have it.

EFFECT OF FAILURE OF UNITED STATES TO HAVE ACTED IN KOREA ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator Morse. General, in your very able speech before the joint session of Congress, you said—at least the copy I have quotes you as saying:

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint proved a sound one.

My question is What is your speculation and judgment as to what most likely would have happened in southeastern Asia if we had not gone back into Korea?

General MACARTHUR. If we had not intervened in Korea, I do not believe the South Korean forces would have been able to resist the advance of the North Koreans; and within a short time, I think, the North Koreans would have overrun the entire country.

Senator Morse. Do you think then, General, that the North Koreans or other Communist forces would have proceeded to attempt to take over other territory in southeastern Asia?

General MACARTHUR. That, of course, is an entirely speculative question. But it is the norm of conduct of an expanding imperialistic country to do so.

Senator Morse. I quite agree with you that it is a speculative question. Yet we are dealing in this whole subject matter with the whole question of our policy in Asia, and one of the justifications given by some spokesmen for the administration for going back into Korea was that if we didn't, not only would we lose Korea but other parts of southeastern Asia.

I was interested only if you shared that point of view.

General MACARTHUR. If we had not gone into Korea, the military potential of China would have been available for other areas; whether they would have used it or not, I wouldn't attempt to speculate.

BUYING TIME FOR PREPAREDNESS

Senator Morse. Now, it is said, in answer to the question frequently asked, what is our policy in Korea, that the dominant phase of it is to buy time long enough to get our own defenses to the point where we could meet an all-out war with Russia, if it should come.

Is it your opinion that our operation in Korea can be justified on the ground that it is buying time necessary to get our own defenses in order to meet an all-out war with Russia?

General MACARTHUR. The great trouble, Senator, is when you try to buy time in Korea, you are doing it at the tremendous expense of American blood. That does not seem to me to be buying time. It seems to me to be sacrificing our youth.

Senator Morse. Is it your opinion that we would lose more American blood if we went into an all-out war with Russia now in our present state of defenses than would be the case if we held off for 12 months, taking the losses that we are taking in Korea, in the hope that at the end of 12 months we would be in a stronger position to defeat Russia, if she started an aggressive attack against us?

General MACARTHUR. The answer to that question, Senator, cannot be categorical. It is basically dependent upon what the Soviet intend to do, whether they intend to attack us or not. I couldn't tell you.

The relativity of our preparedness now and our preparedness 12 months from now, will depend largely upon them. As we build up, will they build up? I couldn't tell you. Those subjects have been considered by other agencies than my own. What I devoted myself to in my report to Congress were those problems which belonged to my own territory.

The question you ask is one that goes far afield from that. As I have not been a part of the policies that have been evolved by our military and our Government in the over-all program, I wouldn't

attempt to discuss them. I wouldn't attempt to assume the authority or the authoritative voice that would answer—

Senator MORSE. I think your answer is a perfectly proper one for you to make. But it is true, is it not, that my question does outline one of the differences that is claimed to exist between the policy that you advocate in Asia, compared with the policy that has been represented by various spokesmen in the administration they think should be followed, namely, the policy of buying time until we can get into a better position to fight Russia, if we have to fight Russia? General MACARTHUR. I have never accepted the theory that underlies your question—that the bringing of the Korean problem to a close would necessitate bringing the Soviet into war against us. I believe that there is an excellent chance that if you apply the power against the Chinese, that that would necessarily involve the Soviet into taking action against us? I tried to explain that this morning—my point of view.

DANGER OF SOVIET INTERVENTION

Senator MORSE. I understand that, and I want to relate that testimony of yours this morning to this question which, in my opinion, sets out one of the differences in representations that are made by the two sides of this controversy; and I will follow it, then, with this question:

I am to understand, from your testimony, that you discount the danger of Russia coming into the war, either with a bombing operation, or on a full-scale basis, including manpower, if we should bomb bases in Manchuria?

General MACARTHUR. That is stating it in a little different way than the way I stated it, Senator.

I stated that under the present conditions, the losses we are sustaining, of Americans in Korea, cannot go on indefinitely, without bleeding this country white.

Senator MORSE. I agree.

General MACARTHUR. I say that if you are trying to buy time, you are doing it the worst way you can. You are buying time at the expense of American blood. I think that is too expensive.

There is no certainty that Russia will come in.

There is no certainty that she will not come in.

There is no certainty that anything that happens in Korea will influence her.

That is speculative.

You have to take a certain degree of risk on these things, one way or another.

All I know is that our men are going by the thousands over there, every month, and if you keep this thing on indefinitely, nothing could happen that would be worse than that.

Therefore, I suggest that some plan be carried out that will bring this dreadful slaughter to a definite end; that we shall not continue to buy time, as you put it, sacrificing thousands of American boys every month.

It is too expensive, from my point of view.

Senator MORSE. I do not quarrel with you on that.

RELATIONSHIP OF TIME ELEMENT TO UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS

General MACARTHUR. Now, as far as buying time is concerned, you make the assumption that we increase our strength as compared with the enemy's.

That is too speculative.

If we add 50 divisions to our forces, he might add 60. He can do it just as quickly as we can.

The relativity of the forces that are involved—these basic questions are too complicated to be answered in the categorical way that you present the questions. Your questions are really argument, and I cannot meet them except what I have said before—that we do face an actual condition in Korea in which we are losing thousands and thousands and thousands of men in an indecisive way.

I do not believe that that is warranted by any concept that relatively we might increase our strength as compared with a foe who has not as yet indicated that he really intends to strike.

We do not know.

This is speculative; but I do know, when we have got a war on our hands, and when we are suffering the way we do, we should try to bring it to an end.

I do say that the worst thing that we can do is go on indecisively sacrificing these men, with no definite end in sight.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON STOPPING AGGRESSION IN KOREA

Now, my proposition is, in my opinion, the best way, and as far as I know, the only way in which a solution has been offered, and on January 12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently thought so, too.

Now, if there is any way in which—if there is any proposition that has been made, any place, here or any other place, to bring this thing to a conclusion, without abject appeasement and surrender on the enemy's terms, I would be the first one to want to try it.

The only way I know, when a nation wars on you, is to beat her by force. I do not know of any argument that will bring an end to this thing.

War, in itself, is the application of superior force, and as we chose that path, and have entered upon that path, it seems to me that we must end it in some way.

Now, there are only three ways that I can see, as I said this morning: Either to pursue it to victory; to surrender to an enemy and end it on his terms; or, what I think is the worst of all choices, to go on indefinitely and indefinitely, neither to win nor lose, in that stalemate; because what we are doing is sacrificing thousands of men while we are doing it.

If you could just say that this line stops aggression, and we didn't lose the men, that would be a different thing; but every day over there you have this terrific and savage conflict, the most savage I ever fought in; and you are losing the very flower of our youth, and if you keep on month after month, and month after month, why, these losses are going to mount up to figures which would stagger the imagination.

Now, in that third process of merely continuing, as has been projected in some circles, that leads to an indefinite sacrifice of lives. Senator MORSE. Will the general let me say that—

General MacARTHUR. Now, war never before in the history of the world has been applied in a piecemeal way, that you make half war, and not whole war.

Now, that China is using the maximum of her force against us is quite evident; and we are not using the maximum of ours against her, in reply.

The result is—we do not even use, to the maximum, the forces at our disposal, the scientific methods, and the result is that for every percentage you take away in the use of the Air and the Navy, you add a percentage to the dead American infantrymen.

It may seem emotional for me to say that, but I happen to be the man that had to send them into it. The blood, to some extent, would rest on me; and with the objectives, I believe I could stop them—it seems terrific to me that we should not attempt something.

ALLEGED LACK OF POLICY IN KOREA

The inertia that exists. There is no policy—there is nothing, I tell you, no plan, or anything.

When you say, merely, "we are going to continue to fight aggression," that is not what the enemy is fighting for.

The enemy is fighting for a very definite purpose—to destroy our forces in Korea.

We constantly, every day, run that risk, without the potential of defeating him, and stopping him—to come again.

He attacks today. We resist it. We fall back. We form a new line, and we surge back.

Then, he is right back, within a week, maybe, up to the battle front with his inexhaustible supply of manpower. He brings in another hundred thousand, or another half-million men, and tosses them at these troops constantly.

That is a new concept in war.

That is not war—that is appeasement.

Senator MORSE. General, let me say that I haven't any doubt about the fact that my questions are argumentative. I do not see any way of avoiding it when we are confronted here with analyzing the two sides in a great argument, namely your proposals or program in Asia, and the proposals of those in the administration who have differed from you.

All I am seeking to do is to bring out into this record with crystal clearness—and you certainly are making it crystal clear—the basis for your point of view that we ought to follow the suggestions that you made in your speech.

I want you to understand as I ask you my questions, that is the only motivation behind those questions.

RESULT OF BOMBING MANCHURIA

Now my next question is if following the bombing in China of the Manchurian bases Russia should carry out her aid and assistance agreement with Red China and proceed to help Red China with an all-out bombing attack of her own, would we then in our present state of defense lose more men than we would lose if we buy time, as is alleged, for some little time in the future until we get our own defenses in a stronger position?

In other words my question is what is your judgment as to the effect in terms of American losses that an all out war with Russia and Asia at the present time would cost?

General MacARTHUR. My own belief is that what will happen in Korea and Asia will not be the deciding factor in whether the Soviet he will, and there is nothing that I can see that would prevent it, but I do say that the constant sacrifice of blood, of American blood in Korea today, is of so serious a nature that we must face that problem irrespective of what the future, the speculative future may have in store.

WAR WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator MORSE. Do you consider, General, that we are in fact today at war with Communist China?

General MacARTHUR. I don't see how it's possible that Communist China could be more at war with us than she is today.

Senator MORSE. That seems to me to be—

General MacARTHUR. Now we are not at war with her. We are very limited in our repulse of her efforts, and all I say is that after due warning to China that she cannot continue in this almost fantastic favoritism of war to her, that if she continues, if she will not sit around a peace table and discuss this matter rationally, that we should take all the necessary economic and military sanctions that are necessary to force her to stop.

Senator MORSE. Which would include a declaration of war against her?

General MacARTHUR. That is beyond my technical province. That we would use the necessary force to require her, to force her to stop her predatory actions in Korea, I would say "Yes."

If that meant that you would have to acknowledge the state of war that she has declared on us, and admit it, of course the answer is "Yes."

Senator MORSE. If we gave her an opportunity—

General MacARTHUR. I think that we should say explicitly, Senator, that if this thing was not brought to an end within a reasonable time, that this would mean the culmination of the all-out forceful effort to knock her out.

MACARTHUR OFFER TO MEET ENEMY COMMANDER IN FIELD

Senator MORSE. To a degree isn't that exactly what you had in mind when you issued a notice to the Communist military leaders prior to your recall that you would meet with them on terms of surrender, and failing in that, you wanted them to understand that you would resort to other means to protect American interests? Is that in essence what your notice to them meant?

General MacARTHUR. Well, the notice I put out was merely that which every commander at any time can put out; that he would confer with the opposing commander in chief in an endeavor to bring hostilities to an end.

I would have had no authority to discuss peace terms, but I would have had the authority to consult with the commander in chief of the enemy's forces in an endeavor to bring an armistice which might result in peace terms.

Senator Morse. Is it your understanding, General, that the language that you used in that notice to the Communist military leaders was part of the cause of your recall?

I repeat my question. Is it your understanding that the language you used in your message to the Chinese Communist military leaders—that you stood ready to meet with them in regard to surrender terms, and their failure to do that would endanger them to other forms of attack—was part of the cause of your recall?

General MacArthur. I know nothing about the reasons for my recall except the order the President issued.

Senator Morse. I do not either, but I have read, as I assume you have—

General MacArthur. I can't believe that the traditional authority that a commander in the field has to negotiate with his vis-à-vis, the opposite commander, on an armistice would be the subject of criticism from any source whatsoever in the world.

Senator Morse. Is it true, General—
General MacArthur. An effort to bring about peace and end bloodshed, I can't believe that that would influence in any way, shape, or manner my recall.

MACARTHUR'S OFFER AND PRESIDENT'S PLANNED ANNOUNCEMENT

Senator Morse. Is it true, General, that some short time before you issued that notice—and I prefer to call it a notice, because if my understanding of the language is correct, it was a notice rather than an ultimatum, as it has been referred to in the press—is it true that prior to your issuing that notice to the Communist military leaders, you received a message, I believe from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or through whatever Army channels sent notice to you, that the President of the United States was at work on a notice or a message that he sought to publicize sometime in the near future?

General MacArthur. Yes; I received such a message. It had nothing to do with my statement whatsoever, though.

The President is constantly, as I understand it, engaged in methods to try to bring the thing to an end, and the message I received hadn't the slightest bearing upon the statement I put out, which was a military appraisal, my military appraisal of the situation, and my offer to meet the commander in chief to discuss peace terms.

I had twice before put out similar statements with the North Koreans, once to the Prime Minister and the other to the commander in chief, in which I suggested meeting him and discussing peace terms. There is nothing unusual or unorthodox or improper that I can possibly read into the statement I made on September 24.

Senator Morse. Please understand I am seeking only to make a record here—

General MacArthur. I mean March 24.

Senator Morse. Please understand that I am seeking here to make a record only of my understandings of some of the allegations that are made against you, which have become involved in this controversy; and, therefore, I ask you this question:

Is it your understanding that the administration considered that the notice which you served on the Communist Chinese military leaders embarrassed the President in connection with the paper or document

that he was working on in that your notice could not be reconciled with what he proposed to make public?

General MacArthur. I was not aware of it. It was the last thing in the world that I would have wished to have done, to embarrass the President or anyone else who is working to bring about peace.

Senator Morse. You had not been advised by anyone, including the President or any subordinate to the President, that your notice to the Chinese leaders embarrassed the completion of the plans that the President was working upon in respect to the notice that he was preparing to serve on the Chinese Communists?

RESULTS OF MACARTHUR'S OFFER

General MacArthur. I received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after I put out my statement, a message which called my attention to the fact that any statements involving politics had to be cleared with the State and Defense Departments, and that if any contacts were made by the enemy commander in chief with me, I was to immediately report them, which, of course, I would have anyway.

Senator Morse. You have really answered my next question, but I want to state my next question in the interest of continuity of analysis.

It is true, then, that following the notice that you served on the Communist military leaders, you received a notice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that in effect in the future you should get clearance? General MacArthur. I did not regard it as a rebuke. I received nothing from Washington at any time that directly referred to my military analysis of the 24th.

Senator Morse. You did not interpret, then, the message that you received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I read last night in the Document Room, following your notice to the Communist leaders, you did not consider that notice as referring even indirectly to the incident of your serving a notice on the Communist military leader?

General MacArthur. It only had the general reference that if the Communist military leaders contacted me, I should report it at once, and recalling the so-called gag rule that states political statements should be cleared.

I may say that when that policy was enunciated in December that I immediately sent my first communiqué after that to the Department of Defense for clearance and the Department of Defense came back and said that my communiqués dealing with the battle situation need not be submitted.

I may say that the President himself, under pressure from the press, confirmed that and said I could make any remarks I wished about the Korean situation.

CLEARANCE OF POLITICAL NOTICES WITH WASHINGTON

Senator Morse. Is it not true, General, that the message that you received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to the notice that you served on the Communist military leaders stated, in effect, that the administration was in the process of carrying on negotiations with the representatives of allies in the United Nations concerning proposals for a settlement of the Korean struggle with the Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. It did. But it had no reference to any particular terms or any particular situation. It was merely normal. And the purpose of that message to me was to find out what modifications might be necessary in limitation of our advances north, whether I thought we should limit our advances north to some particular line, and they wanted to get my views on it.

Senator MORSE. You would be surprised then if any witness for the administration in this hearing should take the position in his testimony that it is the view of the administration that the message you received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to your serving the notice on the Communist military leaders gave you what they considered to be adequate notice that you should have cleared with the administration before you issued the notice to the Communist leaders? You would be surprised if they took that position?

General MACARTHUR. I would be surprised; yes. It didn't make the slightest impression of that sort upon me.

Senator MORSE. I do not know, General, whether they are going to so testify. But, as a lawyer, I went through these documents last night looking for theories. In a law case you have got to find the theories, and I was trying to figure out what the theory is going to be. General MACARTHUR. You understand, Senator, if there is a commander commanding as I did in Korea, he has certain obligations. One of those obligations is the protection of his troops, to bring the battle to an end whenever he can. He operates accordingly.

Now, what I did, I can't conceive of in any way embarrassing, harassing, or influencing anything which the President or the United Nations were doing along that line. It might be that it might have helped, but it certainly was not traversing anything of that sort.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman—

General MACARTHUR. Of course, if I thought it had, I wouldn't have issued it; that is self-evident.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I did not realize 30 minutes had already slipped away. I apologize to my colleagues.

General MACARTHUR. As a matter of fact, Senator, the statement I made on March 24 had been prepared several days before I received any message about the preparation that was going on by the President or Lake Success, whatever it might have been. It was largely prepared as a part of psychological warfare. The only question was the issuance—when it should be issued. It was sent out and dropped by the millions into the enemy territory. That is one of the methods by which we fight modern warfare, the psychological efforts we make to destroy the morale of the combatants' forces that are against us. This was—most of this message was intended along that line and was devised and gotten up with the aid and assistance of psychological experts that were doing that. It had no more reference to the high command's position than any normal order that I would have issued to the command there in Korea.

SOVIET SUPPLIES TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Senator MORSE. I want to hastily ask one more question. It is true, is it not, General, that there are bases in Russia as well as bases in Manchuria which are supplying the Communist forces with matériel at the present time, constituting part of these supply lines?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you. But I believe that the supplies that are being furnished by the Soviet are diminishing. I do not believe the Soviet is supplying the Chinese Communist troops in the same way that they supplied the original North Korean army.

I believe that these forces from China now are much more on their own resources than the North Korean forces that originally attacked. Those forces were supplied with Russian matériel, but much of the matériel the Chinese Communists now have is not Russian. There is no indication that there has been a step-up, quite the contrary, in the supplies that the Soviet has been furnishing to the battle front in Korea.

Senator MORSE. You do not place much reliance upon reports that we are reading in the press and periodicals that this recent conference between the Chinese Communist leaders and Russian leaders has resulted in a pact for the speed-up of war matériel by Russia to China?

General MACARTHUR. That I couldn't tell you. But when I left, by the time I left, there was no indication of it.

Senator MORSE. We do know that to the extent that they are using heavy equipment, to the extent any of it is replaced, it must necessarily be replaced in Russia because the Chinese Communists do not manufacture it.

General MACARTHUR. The Chinese Communist troops are lacking in heavy equipment; they are lacking in artillery; they are lacking in trucks; they are lacking in a good many things. It is my own belief that everything China gets now from the Soviet she pays for. It is quite possible that the North Koreans may have done the same, but I would doubt it.

Senator MORSE. I want to waive now my further questions, Mr. Chairman, feeling, as you suggest, that it is very important to have the General back, that we have before us the documents containing the exchanges of messages between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the General, because in fairness to everybody concerned, I think we need, in relation to a good many other messages, just the kind of explanation that he has given us here regarding the particular message to which I referred. I do not think you can get to the bottom until we do.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair can only reiterate I will be very happy to ask for those documents.

Senator McMAHON?

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I want to start by saying that I have many questions, and I will make no apology for the time that I take because we are here discussing the survival of our Nation, which means the future of civilization itself.

GLOBAL PROBLEM OF COMMUNISM AND GLOBAL DEFENSES

General, we are faced, are we not, with a global problem in the ambitions of Communist Russia?

General MACARTHUR. Faced with what, Senator?

Senator McMAHON. A global problem.

General MACARTHUR. Unquestionably.

Senator McMAHON. You have given that problem a great deal of thought, I assume? Don't you hear me, General?

General MACARTHUR. Yes. Yes; I have, sir.

Senator McMANON. And, therefore—
General MACARTHUR. With particular attention, of course, to my own theater.

Senator McMANON. Pardon me?
General MACARTHUR. With particular attention, of course, to my own theater. My responsibilities are in my own theater.

Senator McMANON. That is correct. As you have said on three or four occasions today, you are a theater commander.

General MACARTHUR. I was.

Senator McMANON. I accept the amendment.
I believe you said to Senator Johnson that as a theater commander you had made no determination in your own mind on either universal military service or concerning the amount of troops or number of troops that we should have for our global defense.

General MACARTHUR. That is correct. That problem did not fall within my responsibilities or authorities.

Senator McMANON. I take it, therefore, General, that you have not clearly formulated in your own mind—I do not say this critically because you were a theater commander—but you have not formulated in your own mind how we are going to put on a global defense if Russia decides to make global war upon us.

General MACARTHUR. I have my own views, Senator, but they are not authoritative views, and I would not care to discuss them. Because I understand I am here to discuss my own theater. There are other authorities that have all those responsibilities and authority. They are not mine, and I therefore would not superficially inject myself into those discussions.

QUORUM CALL

The CHAIRMAN. It is necessary for the Chair to make an announcement. I have just been advised a quorum call is in progress in the Senate preceding a vote on a motion to recess. I wish to make that announcement for those here who might be interested in voting on the motion to recess.

Senator KNOWLAND. Maybe we could pair up here.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What does the Chair wish to do?

Senator SPARKMAN. Maybe we can all pair.

The CHAIRMAN. It might be we can work out pairs. We may have the Sergeant at Arms over after us.

Senator WINTER. If they do not get a quorum, they can recess.

Senator LONG. Would it not be possible for members to put on that quorum and simply pair these? That has been done occasionally.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been done on occasion but no debate follows this quorum call. A motion to recess is, of course, not debatable. I assume that they will proceed until they get a quorum.

Senator WINTER. Wait until the Sergeant at Arms comes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am perfectly willing to proceed. I do not want to rush anyone. I do not desire to interrupt these hearings. I want everyone to have a full opportunity to express themselves by questions. I may decide it is necessary to go over if the vote comes on the motion to recess, and will turn the hearings over to the Senator from Texas.

Senator CONNALLY. We got permission to sit during the Senate meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. Everyone seems to be in mind to proceed.

Senator McMANON. General, we are not operating under any resolution here, we are here inquiring as to the effects it will have on our country and our defense if we follow the recommendations which you made in your speech to Congress and have repeated here today.

CHANCES OF SOVIETS ENTERING WAR

I take it, General, that you believe that what we do in following out your recommendations will not necessarily bring the Soviets into the war. Is that your position?

General MACARTHUR. That is my belief.

Senator McMANON. Suppose, General, you are wrong about that. You could be wrong about it, couldn't you?

General MACARTHUR. Most assuredly.

Senator McMANON. You did not believe at one time that the Communists of China, Red China, would come into the conflict in Korea.

General MACARTHUR. I doubted it.

Senator McMANON. They did. You now doubt that the Soviets—
General MACARTHUR. In that I was, however, supported by practically everybody. The American Government through its Secretary of State, through its Central Intelligence Agency, who were the best-informed authorities, presented that fact.

Senator McMANON. In other words, everybody that had to do with it turned out to be wrong.

General MACARTHUR. Practically, although, Senator, I think everybody realized that that risk was involved. When we first entered Korea that was inherent to it and it was a calculated risk that was taken.

Senator McMANON. And now, of course, we can't all agree that there is a possibility that the Soviets will come in if we adopt the recommendations that you propose to carry out.

General MACARTHUR. There is that possibility, but there is the certainty as against that, Senator, that if you don't carry out those recommendations, you are going to lose Americans by the thousands every month.

SITUATION IN KOREA NOW

You are going to lose such a basis that it may endanger the entire preparedness program.

If you keep on losing men at the rate you do now for indefinite time, you may find the entire preparedness program will come up against such obstacles as might endanger it.

I believe that what you argue are possibilities. They are possibilities. Everyone will admit that, but what I am arguing against is a certainty.

There is no question about the war being in Korea. There is a great question whether the war would extend some place else.

You have got a war on your hands, and you can't just say, "Let that war go on indefinitely while I prepare for some other war," unless you pay for it by the thousands and thousands and thousands of American boys.

Now that is the responsibility of those who make this decision, and it is a responsibility, as far as I am concerned, I repeat I wouldn't want it on my shoulders.

Your policy as you enunciated there, Senator, means——

DEFENSE OF UNITED STATES IN CASE OF WAR

Senator McMANON. I haven't enunciated it yet. I am simply asking for information as to your views. You see, General, what I want to find out from you is this—that if you happen to be wrong this time and we go into all-out war, I want to find out how you propose in your own mind to defend the American Nation against that war.

General MACARTHUR. That doesn't happen to be my responsibility, Senator. My responsibilities were in the Pacific, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various agencies of this Government are working day and night for an over-all solution to the global problem.

Now I am not familiar with their studies. I haven't gone into it. I have been desperately occupied over on the other side of the world, and to discuss in detail things that I haven't ever superficially touched doesn't contribute in any way, shape, or manner to the information of this committee or anybody else.

GLOBAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES DEFENSES

Senator McMANON. General, I think you make the point very well that I want to make; that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, has to look at this thing on a global basis and a global defense.

You as a theater commander by your own statement have not made that kind of a study, and yet you advise us to push forward with a course of action that may involve us in that global conflict.

General MACARTHUR. Everything that is involved in international relationships, Senator, amount to a gamble, risk. You have to take risks.

Senator McMANON. I couldn't agree with you more.

General MACARTHUR. What I faced in the Pacific, wasn't something that was speculative in the future. It's right now. What are you going to do to stop the slaughter in Korea? Are you going to let it go on? Does your global plan for defense of this United States against war consist of permitting war indefinitely to go on in the Pacific? What is your plan or what is the other plan to stop the war there in the Pacific?

It is there. There is no sophistry of talk when you see thousands of battle casualties every month; you can't talk those off that there is no war. There is a savage war there.

If you are not going to bring the war to a decisive conclusion, what does the preparedness mean? You are faced with a fact in Asia.

You are speculating about what takes place in the rest of the global parts of the world. I assume that the plans that are being made are to meet the contingencies that may arise.

Otherwise the whole force of the United States would be poured into Korea.

Senator McMANON. General, the purpose of this hearing certainly is not for any Senator and certainly not one who is ill-equipped as I am, to argue this question with you this time.

My purpose is to try to develop information that will be helpful to me in reaching my final conclusions on the matter. General, are you aware of what our atomic preparedness situation is today?

General MACARTHUR. Only in a very general way, sir.

USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB

Senator McMANON. I am not asking you for numbers, but do you know the numbers in our stockpile?

General MACARTHUR. I do not. I have no more information on that than the average officer would have. It's confined to a very select circle, you know.

Senator McMANON. Have you ever asked about that? Have you ever asked for information on it, General?

General MACARTHUR. On the atomic thing?

Senator McMANON. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. I have discussed it, but I have never attempted to pry into matters which I regarded as beyond my own authority.

Senator McMANON. In the course of your conduct of your duties in the Far East, as a theater commander, did you ever make inquiry of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about our atomic situation?

General MACARTHUR. I have made inquiries as to what might be the potentialities and possibilities of the use of the atomic bomb in my own theater. I know what that is.

Senator McMANON. Have you at any time advocated the use of the atomic bomb in your theater?

General MACARTHUR. Of the atomic bomb?

Senator McMANON. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. The limit of——

Senator McMANON. Pardon me?

General MACARTHUR. The limit of what I did was to ask for information as to whether there were any plans to use the atomic bomb in the Far East.

Senator McMANON. Did you recommend its use?

General MACARTHUR. I did not. As I understand it, the use of the atomic bomb has, by fiat and order, been limited to the decision of the President of the United States.

Senator McMANON. That is true. Of course, I wondered whether you made any recommendations.

General MACARTHUR. Why should I, Senator?

Senator McMANON. I am not asking you why; I am just asking whether you did, and you answered that you did not.

General, are you familiar with the fact that we held some tests out in Nevada a few months ago which were known as the Nevada tests?

General MACARTHUR. I am aware of that.

Senator McMANON. Are you familiar with the results of those tests?

General MACARTHUR. Only in a very general way.

[Deleted.]

ATOMIC BOMB STOCKPILE OF RUSSIA

Senator McMANON. Do you think or have you any intelligence, any access to intelligence reports about Russian potentialities in the building of atomic weapons?

General MACARTHUR. Very little.

Senator McMANON. Does that little give you an estimate as to how many they possess today?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator McMANON. Have you sought to get that information?

General MACARTHUR. Not at all.

Senator McMANON. If, by following your recommendations, a conflict is precipitated with Soviet Russia, be it in the European theater or the United States itself, or in the Far East, you have made no study as to the kind of damage that they could do to our forces in Korea and our general situation in the Far East with their atomic weapons; is that correct?

General MACARTHUR. I don't believe for a minute from my general knowledge of the situation that the enemy has the potential or the inclination to use his limited atomic weapons in such an area as Korea or China.

Senator McMANON. You said this morning, General, that you did not believe that the Russians could land in Japan if we kept control of the sea around Japan, and in the air. Was I correct?

General MACARTHUR. Not quite, Senator. I said that they couldn't overrun Japan; that they would be limited to isolated efforts.

Senator McMANON. Well, when I said take Japan, I meant take it effectively into their control, as I understood it, and you said it would be impossible.

UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS FOR ALL-OUT WAR IN THE FAR EAST

General MACARTHUR. With that explanation, I agree. As long as we hold command of the sea and of the air, no potential enemy can launch an amphibious force against us with any hope of success.

As long as we maintain sea and air control of the ports of Asia, from Vladivostok all the way down to Singapore, they can't successfully launch an effort against us. As long as we maintain that, the enemy would have grave difficulty in overrunning anything in our littoral island line of defense.

Senator McMANON. Have we sufficient planes and ships, in your opinion, in the Far East today to maintain that kind of a defense, if the Russians should precipitate themselves into this battle?

General MACARTHUR. I believe they are available.

Senator McMANON. Are they in the Far East today?

General MACARTHUR. I couldn't tell you, Senator, what the enemy would launch against us. It is speculative. I gave my best estimate of that this morning. We have certain reserves, and I am sure that if the enemy attacked in overwhelming force we could get our reserves there in time to combat them. I believe sincerely that we have the air resource to beat off such an attack, and the Navy resource is unquestioned.

Senator McMANON. If they should precipitate that attack in the Far East, would the Russians—I take it, with the forces that they have in the Far East at this time, we would have to take some of our reserves from the continental United States and send them over?

General MACARTHUR. It would depend upon the force with which the enemy attacked.

RUSSIAN STRENGTH IN THE FAR EAST

Senator McMANON. You said this morning that they had [deleted] thousand planes there, I believe.

General MACARTHUR. Some estimates were made. My own estimate was that they could maintain about half that at the start, and that their strength would diminish rapidly from wear and tear; but I believe that they are too far from their bases in continental Russia to keep up a magnified pressure. They have not got the potential to bring the gasoline; they have not got the potential to bring a great many things over.

I also said I thought from the disposition of the Russian forces in Siberia that they were defensive positions.

Senator McMANON. Has your intelligence advised you of any message from the Russians as to what they intend to do if we bomb in Manchuria?

General MACARTHUR. None whatsoever. If such information exists, it has never come to me. If such information exists, I am sure it would have been sent to me.

Senator McMANON. General, are you aware of the kind of civilian defense we have in the United States today?

General MACARTHUR. Only in a general way, Senator.

Senator McMANON. You know it is very sketchy.

General MACARTHUR. I would assume so.

Senator McMANON. Have you thought about the possibility—General MACARTHUR. For that matter, I am quite sure it is sketchy in every country in the world.

POSSIBILITY OF ATTACK ON UNITED STATES

Senator McMANON. Have you thought about the possibility of the Russians launching a surreptitious attack on the United States and its vital production centers through atomic sabotage?

General MACARTHUR. In a general way only. Once again that isn't my theater of responsibility, Senator.

Senator McMANON. I understand that, General. I am just trying to introduce a few of the considerations that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Commander in Chief, I presume, must have in mind in determining what kind of action should be taken in any specific theater. General MACARTHUR. That is quite correct, Senator; I have no doubt they do. But I have just read what the opinion was of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12, which was to follow in general the same concepts that I have.

If they have changed, that is something else again. I wasn't informed of it, but at that time they agreed with my concepts.

Senator McMANON. And, of course, General, that recommendation of January 12—and I do not assert it as a fact at this time, the Joint Chiefs will have to explain that themselves—but there is certainly the possibility that that concurrence, if you wish to call it that, was based upon the contingency of a forced evacuation of Korea. That possibility existed; didn't it, General?

RISKS IN THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION

General MacARTHUR. That possibility exists; yes, sir. That you are driving at, as I get it, Senator, is our enunciating the risks that come if the Soviets should attack. All I can say is that those risks should have been discounted when we entered the war in Korea.

Nothing new has developed to change it. Those responsibilities of those who sent our troops into Korea were just as great at that time as they are now. The risks were just as great then as they are now.

That was a considered action taken by the Government of the United States. I didn't have a thing to do with it. This was a policy that was given me.

Now, those risks that you are enunciating now are the risks that were involved in the original decision. They were taken by the United States.

Now, the United States has committed itself there. All I am advocating is how we can accomplish our purpose or extricate ourselves from the difficulties that have been involved.

Senator McMANON. And now, General, before it is too late, I want to examine the risks of the course which you wish to pursue because if the risks are so great as to prejudice the existence of this Nation, then it is time we stopped and weighed those risks, until we get into a position to rebut them and to meet them.

General MacARTHUR. You assume, of course, that relatively your strength is going up much more than the enemy's. That is a doubtful assumption, Senator.

STATE OF UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS FOR GLOBAL WAR

Senator McMANON. Well, General, if that is not true on the short-term basis, then it will come, I am sure, as news to everybody in the United States Senate. We have been proceeding on the assumption, as our mobilizer-in-chief said the other day, of no attack until 1953. By then, we will be so strong that they can't attack us, because by that time we will have the planes, we will have the bombs—amounts that we haven't got today—we will have the men in uniform, and we may be in shape to meet this attack, which we are not in shape to meet today.

General MacARTHUR. And in 2 years what will be your casualty rate of American boys in Korea?

Senator McMANON. And, General, I ask you what our casualty rate will be in Washington, D. C., if they put on an attack, an atomic attack—and I had better change it from Washington lest I be thinking about myself, to New York or the other cities of the United States, to say nothing of the American boys who are going to die in the air and sea in this logistical sort of support of the forces into China?

General MacARTHUR. All those risks, I repeat, were inherent in the decision of the United States to go into Korea.

Senator McMANON. General, I am not saying that they were not. What I am trying to say is that now is the time, it would seem to me, to stop, look, and listen and see where we are before we plunge into a course that may take us over the precipice before we are ready.

General MacARTHUR. What is your plan, then, to end Korea?

EFFECT OF DECISION TO DEFEND KOREA ON AMERICAN PRESTIGE IN FAR EAST

Senator McMANON. I would like to quote to you your language on going into Korea, which was very beautifully written, and I think it ought to be in the record:

The decision of President Truman on June 27 lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly toward extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area struggling for freedom. It swept aside in one great monumental stroke all of the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene.

General, do you regard the threat to us and to our national survival—

General MacARTHUR. The quotation that you read, Senator, is quite true. It did restore at one stroke the enormous prestige of the United States. It confirmed the people of the Far East that we were not going to let them slide into slavery, that we were determined we were going to meet aggression on every front that it showed itself, that we were not going to confine ourselves and say we will defend in this sector but all the other sectors globally we will let go.

It was the enunciation which was the very antithesis of defeatism, which has been so pronounced that we could not meet aggression except in one area of the world. It meant that we, if the enemy was going to encroach in two areas, we would meet him on two areas; in three areas, we would meet him on three areas; that he was just as divided as we were; that if we could not defend wherever he aggressed or started to attack, you admit before the conflict that you are going to be defeated.

This is global, as you said yourself this is a global proposition, and you can't let one-half of the world slide into slavery and just confine yourself to defending the other. You have got to hold every place.

Now, in the Far East there was a tremendous belief that we were not going to defend the Far East, and when we moved in to defend Korea, it gave an enormous uplift throughout that entire section of the world.

If there is anything that I have said that lead you to believe that I was critical of the decision to defend Korea, I would correct it immediately.

Senator McMANON. No, General; I just thought that was such a fine statement.

ENDING THE KOREAN WAR

General MacARTHUR. The only thing I am trying to do, Senator, is to settle the thing in Korea to bring it to a decisive end. I believe it can be brought to a decisive end without the calamity of a third world war. I believe if you let it go on indefinitely in Korea, you invite a third world war. I believe the chances of the terrible conflict that you so rightly dread—and all the rest of us dread with you—would be much more probable if we practice appeasement in one area even though we resist to our capacity all along the line.

That is all I am saying. I am saying it with the acute consciousness of the dreadful slaughter that is going on in Korea today. If

it is possible to bring it to a successful and an honorable end, I believe we should take the chance of doing so.

Now, in all the discussions today there has been no proposal that has been made here as to how to end the Korean problem satisfactorily and honorably. I believe in the method, as I have enunciated, and on January 12, the Chiefs of Staff believed so, too.

Now, they may have changed, and shifted. I do not know.

Senator McMANON. We will find out.

General MACARTHUR. They will speak for themselves.

Senator McMANON. We will find out.

CASUALTIES IN KOREA

General MACARTHUR. But still I am of that opinion; and I shrink—I shrink with a horror that I cannot express in words—at this continuous slaughter of men in Korea.

The battle casualties in Korea today probably have passed the million-man mark. Our own casualties, American casualties, have passed 65,000. The Koreans have lost about 140,000. Our losses, on our side, are a quarter of a million men. I am not talking of the civilian populations, who must have lost many, many, many times that.

The enemy probably has lost 750,000 casualties. There are 145,000 of them that are now in our prison bull pens, prisoners, so they might be excepted from that figure because they live; but a million men in less than 11 months of fighting, in less than 11 months of this conflict, have already gone and it grows more savage every day.

I just cannot brush that off as a Korean skirmish. I believe that is something of such tremendous importance that it must be solved, and it cannot be solved by the nebulous process of saying "Give us time, and we will be prepared; or we will be in a better shape 2 years from now"—which is argumentative.

I don't know whether we will, or not; and neither do you, because you do not know, and none of us know the capacity of the enemy.

He may build faster than we do. I couldn't tell you.

I don't know that, you are gambling on chances; but I say there is no chance in Korea, because it is a fact—you have lost a million men now. You will lose more than a million if you go on another year; if you go on until 1953, you will lose another million.

What are you trying to protect?

The war in Korea has already almost destroyed that nation of 20,000,000 people.

I have never seen such devastation.

I have seen, I guess, as much blood and disaster as any living man, and it just curdled my stomach, the last time I was there. After I looked at that wreckage and those thousands of women and children and everything, I vomited.

Now, are you going to let that go on, by any sophistry of reasoning, or possibilities? They may be there, but this is a certainty.

What are you going to do? Once more, I repeat the question, What is the policy in Korea?

If you go on indefinitely, you are perpetuating a slaughter such as I have never heard of in the history of mankind.

Now, what I am trying to do is to find some reasonable and honorable way to stop that slaughter. It is not to conquer this country, or China, or anything else.

It is to bring this thing to an honorable end.

If you go on, you are going to destroy not only the casualties that I speak of, which are military, but you are going to destroy that people.

Now, I just cannot bring myself to analyze it with that shrewdness of legal capacity that you enunciate in your argument, which is an argument, to let it by.

Your entire drift has been not to do anything, just keep on fighting, losing and bleeding there; and I think we should make some extraordinary effort to bring it to an end.

Senator MANON. I am not going to characterize your proposition. I do not expect that you are going to characterize my position. I will take care of that, myself.

ATOMIC PRODUCTION CAPACITIES OF VARIOUS AREAS

Now, I would like to know this, General: Is there any atomic or plane-building capacity in the Chinese mainland, that you know of? General MACARTHUR. None that I know of. The backwardness of industrial development in China precludes even the concept of such an intricate potential.

Senator McMANON. Then, General—

General MACARTHUR. They may have some of the natural resources that go into the manufacture of them, of the bombs, I couldn't tell you about that; but, it will never be done in our day. Never, in our day, will atomic weapons be turned out of China.

They cannot turn out the ordinary weapons. They do not have the instrumentalities to turn out airplanes, big ships, big guns, many of the other attributes of modern warfare.

Senator McMANON. Western Europe, however, has that capacity, has it not, General?

General MACARTHUR. Senator, as I said, I have not made a study of this matter.

I suppose it has, but I don't know.

Senator McMANON. You would not deny that the capacity, both atomic and the production of planes, of Western Europe, combined with Soviet Russia, would out-produce the United States of America—you would not deny that, would you?

DEFENSE OF EUROPE

General MACARTHUR. Not at all, and any inference from your question that I don't advocate the fullest protection and assistance to Western Europe is quite fallacious, Senator. What I advocate is that we defend every place, and I say that we have the capacity to do it. If you say that we haven't, you admit defeat. If the enemy has that capacity and is divided on all these fronts, we should be able to meet it.

Senator McMANON. General, I do not admit defeat. I am thinking if this war has to be fought, about the total and complete victory. I do not want to blind myself, and speaking for myself, General, with

a devotion for my country that I will match against yours or any man's, I am only speaking about a proposition which I believe is sound, and I know that you will give me credit for believing in that which I think, the same as I certainly give you that credit.

Now, General, do you think that we are ready to withstand the Russian attack in Western Europe today?

General MacARTHUR. Senator, I have asked you several times not to involve me in anything except my own area. My concepts on global defense are not what I am here to testify on. I don't pretend to be the authority now on those things.

When I was the Chief of Staff 20 years ago, that was my problem, and I would have answered it. The Chiefs of Staff or others here are the ones to answer that query, not me.

Senator McMANON. And so, General, you concede it seems to me by that statement, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having access to global intelligence, having made global plans for our defense, may have in that information, and because of that information made decisions contrary to your recommendations which could be sound.

General MacARTHUR. They didn't on January 12, Senator. They had all the information available at that time, and they made the study and their recommendations were as I read you this morning, which coincided with my own, that if you apply that type of sanction in the Far East, you will bring this conflict to an end, that there is a strong possibility that that would be the result.

INTELLIGENCE ON CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTACK

Senator McMANON. General, in September of 1950 did you have any intelligence that the Chinese were going to come in if we went to the Yalu?

General MacARTHUR. I had no concrete information, no, sir.

Senator McMANON. Had you been advised by any of your intelligence officers to that effect?

General MacARTHUR. On September 15?

Senator McMANON. In September, any time in September?

General MacARTHUR. I don't recall it, Senator. That the enemy was shifting his forces northward, I knew thoroughly. That he was massing forces along the Yalu I understood, but he was at that time advertising to the world that such Chinese as went in were individuals and volunteers. He specifically proclaimed that Nationalist China was not involved in that struggle.

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH AND USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator McMANON. General, when you went down to Formosa, you made an estimate of the effective troops that they could supply, did you not?

General MacARTHUR. I beg your pardon, Senator?

Senator McMANON. When you went down to Formosa, you made an estimate of the number of effective troops that Chiang could supply?

General MacARTHUR. That the Nationalist Chinese had on Formosa?

Senator McMANON. That's right.

General MacARTHUR. They had about a half million; yes, sir. Senator McMANON. How many at that time did you think were effective?

General MacARTHUR. I think that the caliber of the personnel was good. Their equipment, as I explained this morning, was spotty. I think they're the same caliber of troops that we are fighting now in North Korea. I believe they could be brought to the same degree of efficiency, and I think those troops are good troops.

Senator McMANON. In the report that you made on your visit to Formosa, did you state how many effective troops Chiang Kai-shek had, in your opinion?

General MacARTHUR. I couldn't tell you, Senator. The report that we made was made by a mission that I sent down there under General Fox.

Senator McMANON. How many did General Fox report could be effectively mounted and used?

General MacARTHUR. They all could be if they were properly equipped and trained. How many were available at that time I really couldn't tell you.

Senator McMANON. When the suggestion was made, General, that Chiang's troops be brought up to Korea soon after the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, you made a finding as to their effectiveness at that time, did you not?

General MacARTHUR. I recommended that they should not be brought up to Korea at that time, that Formosa itself was threatened. Senator McMANON. You went so far as to say that they would be an Albatros around our neck for months.

General MacARTHUR. That is correct. They were lacking in artillery, they were lacking in many of the necessities. We were at that time fighting in the Pusan beachhead, and untrained troops, only partially equipped, would have been of little effectiveness.

However, the main reason that I wished those troops held on Formosa was to defend Formosa, and when the Chinese troops that were threatening Formosa moved north to attack us in Korea, I recommended that the traps be taken off of the Nationalist troops. Senator McMANON. That was based upon the fact that the Chinese Communist effectives had been moved north on the Yalu and they did not have anything on the mainland of China with which to carry on the attack on Formosa?

General MacARTHUR. Nothing that would seriously threaten Formosa, correct.

Senator McMANON. Now who reported that to you, General, your own intelligence or CIA?

General MacARTHUR. I couldn't tell you. It came from various sources, largely from the Chinese Nationalists themselves who reported the movement of the Communist troops.

Senator McMANON. And did they report to you that there were not sufficient effectives left in the south to carry on the raid on Formosa which you feared at the time that the Yalu troops were down in south China?

General MacARTHUR. There was no such report to me. That was my own estimate of the situation on the strengths and relative positions of the various forces.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senator McMANON. When did the CIA leave Korea, General?

General MacARTHUR. When did the what?

Senator McMANON. The CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency operatives leave Korea?

General MacARTHUR. I couldn't tell you. The Central Intelligence Agency doesn't operate under me at all.

Senator McMANON. Were they directed to leave Korea after the Inchon landing by your command?

General MacARTHUR. I don't know what you are talking about, Senator.

Senator McMANON. General, I understood that the Central Intelligence agents disappeared from Korea after the Inchon operation, that very brilliant operation which you directed.

General MacARTHUR. The Central Intelligence agents, Senator, are not under me. As far as I know they never were in Korea. They may have been, but it is not an agency that functions under me. It functions under the Central Intelligence controls here.

AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE ON CHINA

Senator McMANON. You regard your information on China as today being much more extensive than it was two or three years ago, do you not?

General MacARTHUR. I don't know what you mean by that.

Senator McMANON. General, do you think today that you are better informed about the internal situation in China, the general situation in China, than you were 3 years ago?

General MacARTHUR. I thought I was pretty well informed at both times, Senator.

Senator McMANON. You think you were?

General MacARTHUR. Yes.

MACARTHUR LETTER TO EATON, 1948

Senator McMANON. Well, I quote from the March 3, 1948 report to the Honorable Charles A. Eaton, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, in answer to the request that was made by the House committee to you for your opinion on things in the Far East, and you said, if I have a correct copy of it:

China, as you perhaps know, is a theater of the United States Navy, controlled outside the scope of my existing authority. I have no representatives there, and apart from general background knowledge, such detailed information as has been made available to me has been derived largely by indirection. Exhaustive investigations of the Chinese situation have been made by responsible United States officials, but these studies are not within my channel of information or command, and in consequence I am not adequately familiar therewith. I have furthermore not had the opportunity to visit China for many years.

You have not, of course, had an opportunity to go there since this time, General?

General MacARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator McMANON (reading):

With this background, you will readily perceive I am not in a position to render authoritative advice with reference to the myriad of details on which a definitive policy for this particular must necessarily rest.

General MacARTHUR. That is all correct. Senator McMANON (continuing):

The Chinese problem is part of a global situation which should be considered in its entirety in the orientation of American policy. Fragmentary decisions in disconnected sectors of the world will not bring an integrated solution.

Senator WHELER. What is the date of that?

Senator McMANON. I quote from the letter of the general's, dated March 3, 1948.

You also said, General:

In the determination of our global policy care must, of course, be exercised to avoid commitment of our resources beyond what we can safely spare; the sapping of our national strength to the point of jeopardy to our own security and the overburdening of our people beyond their capacity to maintain a standard of life consistent with the energies with which they are naturally endowed.

I will be glad to submit for the record the whole letter.

You remember that letter, of course, General? You referred to it earlier today.

General MacARTHUR. The basic conditions have completely changed since that letter was written, Senator. The war has been precipitated in Korea, and to attempt to apply the rationale of what existed at that time and what exists today is quite fantastic.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Senator McMANON. General, do you believe in the concept of collective security?

General MacARTHUR. What do you mean by "collective security," Senator?

Senator McMANON. Do you believe in the concept of collective security upon which our foreign policy is based?

General MacARTHUR. What do you mean by "collective security?" Senator McMANON. I mean the attempt to weld together a military alliance to keep the peace such as we have attempted to do in the North Atlantic Pact.

General MacARTHUR. I have only a superficial knowledge of the North Atlantic Pact, Senator. I am not prepared to discuss it in any way, shape, or manner.

Senator McMANON. Neither its provisions nor its implementation? General MacARTHUR. I have only the ordinary knowledge that any officer would have on it. You have experts on that. General Eisenhower and others have appeared before you very recently with all the intimate knowledge that comes from the authority and responsibility he has.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen.

Senator McMANON. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the order heretofore, on motion, and in addition, under the information conferred by the Sergeant at Arms, he has been instructed to bring the Senators to the floor.

PROCEDURE FOR HEARINGS

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I ask this question before we leave; Is it understood that when we resume, whenever it may be, next week or otherwise, that we will start where we left off here, so

that those of us who came in at the tail end of this committee table, will not get on the tail end again.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say to the Senator from California that I have not forgotten the time when I was in that position on the committees.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, do you think you could clear me in another day? If you do, I will try to get down from New York tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. General, that is a matter wholly beyond my control. I do not know. I have no idea on earth what course the questions will take. I should be very happy if you could testify tomorrow. I will endeavor to do so, but I have no control over it.

Rather than make such assurance, I would prefer that you come back next week.

Senator WHEAT. Let us try; at least we can get that out of the way tomorrow, and then come back for rebuttal, the rebuttal that Senator Morse has in mind.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I did not hear what the last proposal was.

The CHAIRMAN. The general inquired of me as to whether or not I thought that the committee could finish with him if he came back tomorrow. I have stated that I could not answer that question. I have no idea as to what might develop in the course of this testimony. Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, as I have told you, I looked at the clock, and I saw it was past 6 o'clock, but I have a great many more questions which I propose to address to the general, and I might add I have no apology for it at all, for the length of time that I take on this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not ask the Senator to apologize.

Senator McMAHON. I realize that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I was not directing that remark to the chairman. I was putting it in the record.

I certainly want to apologize to the chairman if he thinks I was directing it to him.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to have the record show that the chairman is not rushing you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question, please? Assuming we go over to next week, will a transcript of today's proceedings be available to us?

The CHAIRMAN. It will.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me if we get that and look it over, we might easily shorten this whole thing because many of the questions that many of us had in mind undoubtedly have been sufficiently thrashed out.

We might shorten it by reviewing the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. What the Senator says is correct.

I have gone over so many things two and three times here that he testified to exactly the same.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it is hard for us to keep them in mind, but we can easily check them if we have a transcript to go through.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course.

Unfortunately, Senators are repetitious.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, would it be in order, sir, to bring the question before us, to move because of the general's consideration, in part, at least, that we meet tomorrow?

The CHAIRMAN. I will be delighted to meet tomorrow. That is not the question. I earnestly hope we can.

The question was whether we could conclude tomorrow.

That is a question I cannot answer.

Senator CAIN. I think that is a calculated risk.

Senator SPARKMAN. I earnestly believe we will save time by going over.

Senator CAIN. I move you, sir, if I am so permitted, that we begin tomorrow morning at 9:30.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I direct this question to the general?

If it would make any difference to him, considering the fact that there may be some divergence of opinion between his opinions, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he would have to come back tomorrow anyway, if he would still like to come tomorrow, or would he like to reserve that until later?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I hope that we can conduct this hearing in an orderly manner. I, of course, will do that; if the general wishes not to return tomorrow, I will endeavor to get another witness here.

Senator LONG. I was under the impression, Mr. Chairman, that the general might have felt that by coming back tomorrow we might not have to call him back later, and it is my guess that the probabilities are that after we hear the Joint Chiefs of Staff we might want to call him back anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. We cannot give those assurances that he will not be called back again.

I would like to, if we can, finish the testimony in chief at the very earliest possible date. That is what I desire to do.

Senator STENNIS. Well, let us come back tomorrow and try, if the general wishes to.

General MACARTHUR. I will come back tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the committee stands in recess until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 6:10 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene Friday, May 4, 1951, at 10:30 a. m.)